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values. The profitability, persistence and robustness of the technical rules are examined. 
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1. Introduction 
Technical analysis constitutes the type of investment analysis which uses simple 
mathematical formulations or graphical representations of financial assets’ time series to 
explore trading opportunities. In its algorithmic, and thus more quantitative form, it utilizes the 
analysis of the asset price’s history, volume data and summary statistics, through mathematical 
tools, usually referred to as technical indicators and oscillators. Even though this form of 
analysis has been widely exploited by both investors and academics over the years, there is a 
long and ongoing discussion about whether it truly has predictive power and can generate 
significant profitability in equities markets. Previous literature is split into studies highlighting 
the genuine profitability of technical analysis (see among others, Brock et al., 1992; Hsu et al., 
2010) and those arguing against it (see among others, Sullivan et al., 1999; Bajgrowicz and 
Scaillet, 2012).  
The success of technical trading rules is associated with asset pricing anomalies, such as 
momentum (Jegadeesh, 1993; Assness, 2013) and reversal (DeBond and Thaler, 1985; 
Jegadeesh, 1990). Momentum is a result of initial under-reaction or delayed over-reaction of 
investors to securities’ price movements, while reversal is a result of initial over-reaction. Some 
recent studies have tried to use this information and employ technical trading rules for the 
creation of universal trend factors and the optimization of asset allocation in portfolio 
construction (see Zhu and Zhou, 2009; Han et al., 2016). From the point of view of 
practitioners, the use of technical analysis is not that debatable, and many successful hedge 
funds and portfolio managers make substantial use of technical trading (see Fung and Hsieh, 
2001; Lo and Hasanhodzic, 2009). 
Nonetheless a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of technical trading on equity markets 
is still being asked for by both academics and practitioners. This is because the majority of 
previous studies tend to be narrowly focused on specific aspects of technical analysis of equity 
indices. For example, looking at a single market index, a restricted number and classes of 
technical trading rules, no disaggregated analysis of the classes that are profitable, or a 
“sterilized” exercise of technical analysis (e.g. no transaction costs involved) is totally different 
from the way traders operate in practice. Other issues, such as the size of the in-sample (IS)/out-
of-sample (OOS) or the level of financial stress and market development are also frequently 
ignored. In addition, no study has consistently measured the persistence of technical analysis, 
the role of frequency in portfolio rebalancing or whether the identified rules survive 
backtesting.  
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Testing a large set of technical trading rules on a given data set risks false rejections of the 
null of efficiency, as some rules in a large set will, by chance, prove to be profitable ex post. A 
researcher first needs to adopt a multiple hypothesis testing (MHT) framework in order to 
identify whether truly profitable rules exist. The framework should be powerful, adaptive and 
computationally efficient. Even if a group of technical rules demonstrates significant excess 
profitability in specific markets, there are still several questions which need to be answered. 
For example, how long does this profitability persist, are the markets during these periods under 
stress or turmoil, what are the optimal IS/OOS ratios for achieving the best performance or at 
what level of transaction costs is excess profitability neutralized? Another important issue 
which also needs to be investigated further is whether the level of financial stress and the level 
of market development lead to short-term anomalies in market efficiency, which allow for such 
profitability. 
For the above reasons, we conduct one of the most extensive studies of technical trading in 
the equities markets ever carried out, as well as proposing a new method controlling for data 
snooping bias while adjusting for the potential issues found in previous techniques. We 
investigate the daily data of nine individual Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
indices and three general MSCI indices replicating the performance of Advanced, Emerging 
and Frontier markets covering the period from 2004 to 2015. As for the technical trading rules 
considered, we employ the expanded universe of 21,000 rules of Hsu, Taylor and Wang (2016) 
incorporating several classes of technical trading indicators and oscillators. Our novel 
methodology accounting for data snooping is based on the false discovery rate (FDR) criterion 
and expands the FDR+/- approach of Barras et al. (2010) in numerous ways. Their FDR+/- detects 
a sufficiently large number of statistically significant positive rules, while allowing for a small 
number of false discoveries (Barras et al., 2010; Brajgowicz and Scaillet, 2012). However, 
when usual resampling procedures (e.g. bootstrapping) are employed to compute each rule’s 
corresponding p-values, large-scale homogeneous discrete p-values are realized, rather than 
the uniformly distributed continuous ones adopted in all previous studies (Storey, 2002; Storey 
et al., 2004; Barras et al., 2010; Brajgowicz and Scaillet, 2012). In addition, previous 
approaches can lead to unnecessary conservativeness and hence, poor estimations of the 
proportion of rules with no significant performance during the parameterization stage of FDR+/-
. In contrast, our discrete false discovery rate approach (DFRD+/-) circumvents these issues by 
constructing a large-scale homogeneous discrete p-values framework, with its main parameters 
being dynamically estimated. Hence, we provide a fully adaptive, computationally and efficient 
4 
 
approach controlling for data snooping bias, which can provide assistance to investors when it 
comes to OOS estimation, portfolio construction and improved decision-making in general. 
Moreover, our proposed method identifies performance persistence of successful portfolios of 
technical trading rules up to three months for some markets (i.e. emerging and frontier), which 
signifies that it is a potentially powerful tool for hedge fund and portfolio managers. 
We employ our proposed method to perform several robustness checks and provide answers 
to the questions raised earlier related to break-even transaction costs and OOS estimation. 
Specifically, a break-even analysis of transaction costs of the outperforming trading rules is 
carried out, while we investigate the OOS performance of the rules in a rolling-forward 
structure, just as fund managers do in practice. Moreover, we analyse their performance 
persistence during the same periods as well as providing evidence of their performance during 
periods of turmoil, using stress indices provided by the Office of Financial Research (OFR). 
Finally, we introduce an innovative method for selecting the significant technical trading rules 
by cross-validating their performance between the full sample and IS/OOS.  
Regarding our results, we find evidence of technical rules profitability after transaction costs 
in all markets studied, with trend-following families, such as moving averages and channel 
breakouts to dominate the contrarian ones. The profitability is stronger in emerging and frontier 
markets compared to the advanced ones. The persistence of this profitability varies over the 
years but is weak in general. Financial stress seems to have an effect on the predictability and 
excess profitability of technical analysis. More specifically, the profitability of technical 
analysis is 5-6 times higher for the US when financial stress levels are low, while the opposite 
trend is observed for other advanced markets and emerging ones.  
The rest of this work is laid out as follows. Section 2 reports the examined data set and 
demonstrates the technical trading rules as well as the performance metrics employed in this 
study. Section 3 presents a discussion on data snooping bias testing as well as the relevant 
literature. The proposed methodology is thoroughly explained in Section 4. The empirical 
results for the IS performance are displayed in Section 5, while those for the OOS are presented 
in Section 6. Section 7 provides our concluding remarks.   
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2. Data set, Technical Trading Rules and Performance Metrics 
This section presents the details of the setting at which the DFDR+/- is applied. In Section 
2.1 the data set with the information regarding the examined markets is introduced. Section 2.2 
describes the technical rules universe and Section 2.3 covers the performance measures used to 
compare the trading rules for different markets. 
 
2.1 Data set 
In this paper, we study nine Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) indices that 
replicate the performance of markets in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, Brazil, 
China, Russia, Estonia, Jordan and Morocco and the three general MSCI indices that replicate 
the World (Developed), Emerging and Frontier markets in total. The MSCI indices are market 
cap weighted indices that reflect the holding returns of US investors in different markets. They 
are denoted in US dollars and are important references for institutional investor
1 ( see among others, Hsu, 2010; Bena et al., 2017). They include large and mid-cap segments 
of the benchmark markets and thus mitigate liquidity and tradability issues. The sample period 
for all time series starts on 1 January 2004 and ends on 31 December 2016. The summary 
statistics of the log returns of the twelve series and of the risk-free rates series are presented in 
Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
All indices are leptokurtic while the risk-free rate series behaves very close to the normal 
curve. The UK, Brazil and Russia display quite high kurtosis. All time series except for the 
Frontier index and the risk-free rate exhibit negative skewness (with the UK having the least). 
The positive autocorrelation coefficient is seen for all times series except for Japan and the US, 
but the reported coefficient is not statistically significant for Japan.  
 
2.2 Technical Rules 
The purpose of technical trading strategies is to generate long (short) positions for the 
coming period based on historical quotes for open, high, low and closing prices along with other 
characteristics such as previous trends/momentums and directional movements. As already 
                                                             
1 99% of the top global investment managers apply MSCI indices (see P&I AUM data and MSCI clients as of 
December 2017).  
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mentioned, their efficacy mainly lies with popular market price anomalies (i.e. momentum and 
reversals). In this study, 21,195 technical trading rules are utilized following the work of Hsu 
et al. (2016) for each of the twelve MSCI indices under study. This universe mainly includes 
trend-following rules such as Filter Rules (FRs), Moving Averages (MAs), Support-Resistance 
rules (SRs) and Channel Breakout rules (CBs), and a class of contrarian rules such as the 
Relative Strength Indicators (RSIs). All of these use lag lengths representing specific 
components (e.g. daily, weekly, monthly, annual) of price trends and reversals that make sense 
economically. These technical indicators are commonly practised by trading desks and hedge 
funds, while they are available on finance websites, and in numerous finance research papers 
and textbooks2. 
The scope of our empirical analysis in Sections 5 and 6 is to explore the value of technical 
analysis in trading through our DFDR+/- procedure. Thus, we explore a very large and diverse 
universe of technical rules, an approach common to all the related literature that explores 
thousands of technical rules (see among others, Brock et al., 1992; Hsu et al., 2010; Sullivan et 
al., 1999; Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012; Hsu et al., 2016). Naturally, some technical rules 
specifications will have more economic plausibility than others. Thus, it makes sense to vary 
the size of the test statistic(휑푗) based on how much economic sense each technical rule makes 
(Harvey, 2017). However, the application of this approach should lead to modifications in both 
the bootstrap and FDR control approach. To the best of our knowledge, no similar procedure 
has been presented in the literature, something that can certainly present an interesting research 
direction.  
Filter Rules (FRs): are simple momentum techniques that generate buy (sell) signals, when 
the market price rises (drops) by more than a given percentage from its previous low (high). 
Setting the threshold percentage allows investors not to be misled by small market price 
fluctuations. 
Relative Strength Indicators (RSIs): are contrarian oscillators that measure the speed of 
change of rapid price movements towards the mean, through overbought/oversold levels. Mean 
reversion is measured as the ratio of higher closes to lower closes (i.e. stocks with more or 
stronger positive changes have a higher RSI than stocks with the same level of negative 
changes). The stock is considered overbought when the RSI is above 70 and oversold when it 
                                                             
2 Earlier studies on technical analysis profitability include those of Levy (1967, 1971), Wilder (1978), Allen and 
Taylor (1992) and Taylor and Allen (1992). 
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falls below 30 as the level of upward movements relative to the downward ones is usually 
normalized between 0 and 100. 
Moving Averages (MAs): Technical analysts explore simple MAs or combinations of them. 
For example, uptrends start to form when the daily price MA exceeds the MA at a specific 
percent. The general rule is that long (short) positions are kept as long as the price remains 
above (below) the MA benchmark. Apart from their simplest version, double and triple MA 
rules are also considered including fast-slow variations along with the rest of the 
parameterizations. 
Support-Resistance rules (SRs): trading rules are based on the premise that the price should 
remain in a trading range capped by a resistance and floored by a support level. Breaching 
these levels suggests that a stock will keep moving towards that direction and initiate 
momentum. A resistance-and-support level is predefined as the highest and lowest closing price 
of the previous 풹 closing prices respectively where 풹 is chosen by the trader. 
Channel Breakout rules (CBs): similar to time-varying SRs, are parallel trends lines that 
form a trading channel. A signal is initiated when the price breaks either the upper or the lower 
bound of the channel. CBs perform well in markets revealing strong trends.  
For the exact characteristics of our technical rules, we refer the reader to Appendix A in Hsu 
et al. (2016).  
 
2.3 Excess Returns, Transaction Costs and Performance Metrics 
In this section, we define the daily return for every index examined as well as the 
performance metrics employed after accounting for transaction costs. First, we calculate the 
daily gross return from buying and holding the index during the prediction period: 
푟푡 = ln % 푃푡푃푡&'( 
where 푃푡 is the spot price on day 푡, and 푃푡&' is the spot price on the previous day. Each calendar 
year in our database has on average 260 trading days. 
Secondly, we need to consider the impact of transaction costs on the technical trading 
simulation. For that reason, we treat transaction costs “endogenously” to the trading process. 
For instance, we deduct one-way transaction costs every time a long or short position is closed 
according to the next period’s index value prediction. We estimate the one-way transaction 
cost taken at time 푡 for trading rule 푗 as: 
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푇퐶푗,푡 = 퐼푗,푡 × 푡푐 × 푃푡 
where, 퐼푗,푡 is the indicator set to 1 when a position is closed for the studied trading rule and the 
transaction cost 푇퐶푗,푡 is deducted (0 otherwise) at time 푡 and 푡푐 represents the level of transaction 
costs used in basis points (bps). 
The transaction cost can negatively affect the performance of the portfolios (Cesari and 
Cremonini, 2003). Industry-based factsheets, traders, retail online brokers, hedge fund 
managers and the academic literature recommend a transaction cost of 25-50 bps for trading 
MSCI indices (see for example, Cesari and Cremonini, 2003; Investment Technology Group, 
2013; Eurex, 2018). MSCI (2013) suggests transaction costs up to 50 bps for their indices. In 
this study, we consider a one-way proportional transaction cost of 25 bps for advanced markets 
(US, UK, Japan, and Developed) and 50 bps for the other markets. These costs correspond to 
fees, bid-ask spread and slippage. These costs are realistic for large institutional investors.  
In terms of performance metrics, we provide the annualized mean excess return and Sharpe 
ratio. In this way, we consider an absolute measure based on each technical trading rule’s 
returns, such as the mean excess return, and a relative performance measure reporting the ratio 
of the mean excess return to the total risk of the investment in terms of excess returns’ standard 
deviation (the Sharpe ratio). Denoting the trading signal triggered from a trading rule 푗, 1 ≤
푗 ≤ 	푙 (where = 21,195) at the end of each prediction period 푡− 1 (휏 ≤ 푡 ≤ 푇) as 푠푗,푡&', where 
푠푗,푡&' = 1, 0, 표푟− 1 represents a long, neutral or short position taken at time 푡, the mean excess 
return criterion 푓푗,푡 for the trading rule 푗 is given by:  
푓푗,푡 = 1푁4[푠푗,푡&'푟푡 − 푇퐶푗,푡 − ln	(1 + 푟푓,푡)]	푇
푡8휏 , 푗 = 1,… , 푙 
where 푁 = 푇− 휏+ 1 is the number of days examined and 푟푓,푡 is the risk-free rate at time 푡. 
The 휏 is the activation period, since some of the technical trading rules use lagged values of 
indices up to one year (260 days). For the risk-free rate, we use the effective federal funds rate 
reported by the Federal Reserve in the US. Since the quotes for the risk-free rate are reported 
on an annual basis, we transform the rates into the daily values by 푟푓,푡 = (1 + 푆푡) :;<= − 1, where 
푟푓,푡 is the estimated daily rate and 푆푡 is the quoted federal funds rate.  
Then, the Sharpe ratio metric expression 푆푅푗	for trading rule 푗 at time 푡 is defined by: 
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푆푅푗,푡 = 푓푗휎푗> , 푗 = 1,… , 푙, 
where 푓푗,푡 is the mean excess return and 휎푗,푡?  the estimated standard deviation of the mean excess 
return. Another important feature of the Sharpe ratio metric is its direct link with the actual t-
statistic of the empirical distribution of a rule’s returns (Harvey and Liu, 2015)3. Thus, such a 
property makes the Sharpe ratio the most appropriate criterion for our proposed multiple 
hypothesis testing framework. In other words, the test statistic (i.e. 휑푗) is the Sharpe ratio4. 
Through the specifications described, the performance of each rule is calculated and tested 
for significant positive difference compared to a benchmark. Following Sullivan et al. (1999) 
and Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012), our benchmark is the risk-free rate that corresponds to 
abstaining from the market when no profitable opportunity is expected. Alternatively, the 
benchmark can be defined as the buy and hold strategy on the MSCI World index or further to 
a combination of bonds and stock indices5.  
The returns of the trading rules should be adjusted for exposure to known risk factors,  
estimated from asset pricing models commonly used in the literature and in practice. 
As they do not exist common (or market specific) risk factors for all market indices under 
study that are recognized and accepted from the related literature, the returns of our technical 
rules cannot be adjusted for exposure based on them. The evaluation of the performance of our 
portfolios match that of portfolio managers and traders and of the related literature in technical 
analysis on multiple market indices (see amongst others, Sullivan et al., 1999 and Hsu et al., 
2010) 
3. Data Snooping Bias and Existing Methods 
Forecasting financial series and assessing the profitability of a series of competing models 
can be considered to be the oldest and most popular research exercise in finance. Financial 
economists and practitioners deal with hundreds of competing models when it comes to the 
                                                             
3 The t-statistic of a given sample of historical returns (@', @A, … @B), testing the null hypothesis that the average 
excess return is zero, is usually defined as C = D>E> √G⁄  , while the corresponding Sharpe ratio is given by the formula  IJ = D>E>. 
4 We observe similar trends in our results with the Sortino ratio, the manipulation ratio and the annualized return 
as performance metrics. Sastry (2018) finds similar power for all four performance metrics.   
5 The choice of a relevant benchmark is central to the hypothesis testing and the set of discoveries. Although 
different possible specifications could be considered, the scope of this study is to propose the new MHT procedure 
in the most common and verified setting. 
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predictability of different assets or the true profitability of trading strategies. In order to 
distinguish the genuine and significant ones from the insignificant, economists and 
practitioners have to employ MHT frameworks instead of the classic statistical inference, 
which can lead to biased estimates. It is very likely that Type I error (i.e. probability of making 
false rejections) will emerge when multiple hypotheses are tested. Classic statistical inference 
fails to capture the exact number of false rejections. MHT specifications attempt to control the 
number of Type I errors in a large universe of jointly tested hypotheses. The most well-
established MHT approaches are the Family-Wise Error Rate (FWER), the False Discovery 
Proportion (FDP) and the False Discovery Rate (FDR). 
FWER is defined as the probability of having at least one Type I error. In other words, it 
measures the probability of having at least one false discovery. A testing method is said to 
control the FWER at a significance level 훼 if FWER 훼. Naturally, when a researcher tests a 
large number of hypotheses, it is highly likely that at least one Type I error will occur. There 
are several approaches to controlling the FWER. The most naïve method of doing so is the 
Bonferroni correction. In this approach, the researcher has simply to divide the number of tests 
from the significance level 훼. Then each test is run with a significance level 훼/푙 (where 푙 is the 
total number of tests). The larger the number of tests, the smaller the common critical p-value. 
The Bonferroni correction is characterized by its simplicity but has been criticized for loss of 
power and a high probability of Type II errors (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). A less strict 
approach to controlling the FWER is Holm’s stepwise method (1979). Here, the null hypothesis 
is rejected when  푝푖 ≤ 훼/(푙− 푖+ 1) for 푖 = 1… 푙. The criterion becomes less and less strict for 
large p-values and thus Holm’s method rejects more hypotheses than the Bonferroni correction. 
However, it is worth noting that both methods ignore the dependence structure of the individual 
p-values, which makes them overly conservative. 
Motivated by this fact, White (2000) introduced the Bootstrap Reality Check (BRC). In this 
approach, the FWER is asymptotically controlled by estimating the sampling distribution of 
the largest test statistic and taking into account the dependence structure of the individual test 
statistics. BRC applies bootstrapping to get less conservative critical values than the 
aforementioned approaches. The main disadvantage of BRC is that it only checks if the model 
or strategy that appears best beats the benchmark. It also has low power when strong 
underperformers exist in the hypothesis testing pool and the relevant p-values are still 
conservative (Romano, Shaikh and Wolf, 2008). To overcome this problem, Hansen (2005) 
£
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introduced the superior predictive ability (SPA) test, which uses studentized test statistics and 
attributes lower weights to those corresponding to poor performers. However, this approach 
also only focuses on the performance of the best strategy. Moving one step forward, Romano 
and Wolf (2005) introduced the StepM test (RW) in an attempt to statistically validate as many 
outperforming strategies as possible. The RW test improves upon the BRC just as the stepwise 
Holm method improves the single-step Bonferroni approach. The RW test initially identifies 
the most robust strategies through a stepdown approach, until a false selection is observed. The 
first step of the RW is the same as in the BRC test. In the next step, the remaining strategies 
are again evaluated over a new critical value (based on bootstrap) and these iterations continue 
until no further strategies are rejected. Likewise, Hsu, Hsu and Kuan (2010) introduced a 
stepwise version of Hansen’s SPA test (2005) to control any negative effect of underperforming 
strategies on the power of the test. Given that RW and also the method of Hsu et al. (2010) are 
based on bootstrap estimates, it is safe to assume that it is less conservative, in spite of the 
correlation structure of the p-values and still asymptotically control FWER (as BRC does). 
However, it still remains a strict approach, since the procedure terminates once a false rejection 
is identified. To solve this issue Romano, Shaikh and Wolf (2008) relaxed the strict FWER 
criterion by introducing the 푘-FWER method (similar to a 푘-StepM approach). The innovation 
of this method is that it allows for a 푘 number of false rejections before it stops. As long as the 
false selections are less than 푘 the procedure continues in subsequent steps similar to RW. This 
makes the outcome less conservative, but the results are quite sensitive to the selection of k. 
The FDR is based on the idea of allowing for a specific number of false negatives when a 
practitioner observes quite a large number of rejections, which increases the power of the test 
while relaxing the testing framework. Introduced by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) as a more 
tolerant error metric, the FDR measures the proportion of false discoveries among true 
rejections of the null hypothesis. Specifically, they suggest that if F and R are the number of 
the total Type I errors (false discoveries) and the rejected null hypotheses (total discoveries) 
respectively, then the FDR is estimated as	퐹퐷푅 = 퐸(퐹/푅). Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) 
conclude that if all tested null hypotheses are true, then FDR is equivalent to FWER. However, 
if the number of true discoveries is lower than the total null hypotheses tested, then FDR is 
smaller than FWER. In addition, the FDR corresponds to the expected FDP, or in other words, 
it controls the FDR at level 훾 (i.e. 퐹퐷푅 = 퐸(퐹퐷푃) ≤ 훾)6. Over the years many studies have 
                                                             
6  L is user defined and should not be confused with M. 
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tried to control the FDR measure, some with more incremental and others with more 
comprehensive approaches. Nevertheless, the fundamental idea of identifying as many true 
rejections as possible without including too many false ones remains the same (Benjamini and 
Yekutiely, 2001; Storey, 2003; Storey and Tibshirani, 2003; Storey et al., 2004; Liang and 
Nettleton, 2012; Liang, 2016). In financial applications, Barras et al. (2010) introduced for the 
first time an FDR approach similar to that of Storey (2003) which focuses on measuring the 
proportion of false discoveries among mutual funds generating alphas, while trying to identify 
those displaying significant positive performance. 
The relevant literature highlights the superiority of the FDR process (see among others, 
Harvey and Liu, 2015; Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012; Liang, 2016). The advantage of this 
method lies in the fact that by tolerating a certain, usually small amount of Type I errors, the 
FDR improves the power to detect more significant discoveries, compared to its stricter 
competitor, the FWER, which guards against a single erroneous selection and so leads to 
missed findings. This implies that lower critical values are used and consequently a larger 
number of significant strategies is selected. This is particularly important in finance and trading 
applications, as in practice investors prefer several alternative strategies, rather than basing 
their entire strategy on a single trading tool. Additionally, the FDR test takes into account all 
the outperforming rules in the population and it does not terminate when a single rule, even the 
best, yields a lucky performance. Therefore, conceptually the FDR application is more suitable 
when analyzing large data sets and aiming to make reliable statements about the realized 
average FDP across the various data sets, as in our case (Benjamini, 2010). Concerning the 
FDP, controlling it can lead to more conservative estimates compared to the respective FDR 
ones (Genovese and Wasserman, 2006). Sun et al. (2015) suggest that in conditions of strong 
dependence FDP can be highly volatile. Additionally, as Fan and Han (2017) find that FDP 
estimates can be relatively small for large data sets, the FDR approach is more suitable for our 
big data analysis. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1 Overview of the FDR Procedure 
As mentioned previously, the FDR is defined as the proportion of false discoveries among 
the rejected null hypotheses. FDR is an expectation and thus its control does not require an 
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additional specification at a probabilistic level (as for example, the FWER does). Methods to 
control the FDR have been suggested by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), Benjamini and 
Yekutieli (2001) and Storey (2002). Benjamini and Hochberg’s method (1995) assumes that 
the p-values are mutually independent, something that is not the case in our study. On the other 
hand, the Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) approach assumes that p-values have a more arbitrary 
dependence structure, but it is less powerful. Storey (2002) improves its power with an 
approach based on the assumption that, for a two-tailed test, the true null p-values are uniformly 
distributed over the interval [0,1], whereas the p-values of alternative models lie close to zero. 
His approach utilizes information from the centre of the distribution of t-statistics (i.e. 휑푗), 
which is mainly represented by non-outperforming rules. A key point regarding this direction 
is the precise estimation of the proportion of rules satisfying the null hypothesis, 휑푗 = 0, (i.e. 
휋N ) in the entire population. A conservative estimator of the 휋N parameter is given by: 
휋N?(휆) = #{푝푗 > 휆; 		푗 = 1,… , 푙}푙(1 − 휆)  
where 휆	 ∈ [0,1) is a tuning parameter indicating above which specific level the null p-values 
exist. The required inputs for the FDR approach are mainly the (two-sided) corresponding p-
values of the performance metrics (휑푗) of each individual rule associated with null hypothesis 
of non-abnormal performance (퐻N푗:휑푗 = 0) against the alternative of abnormal performance 
(퐻퐴푗:휑푗 > 0	or 퐻퐴푗:휑푗 < 0	). Furthermore, there is no need for a priori knowledge of the p-
values distribution. The stationary bootstrap resampling technique of Politis and Romano 
(1994) is applied to obtain the individual p-values. It is applicable in cases where the time series 
are weakly dependent (which is the case in technical rules performance). 
We incorporate into our approach the FDR+/- method of Barras, Scaillet and Wermers 
(2010), which provides separate estimates of the percentages of false discoveries among 
outperforming and underperforming rules compared to the benchmark. However, since we are 
interested in identifying only the positive outperformers in our application, we focus on the 
case where	휑푗 > 0. In the context of the performance of technical trading rules, the FDR+ is 
described as the expected value of the proportion of erroneous selections, 퐹W, over the 
significant and positive rules, 푅W , (i.e. 퐹X
푅X). The number of 퐹W represents the rules, whose p-
values falsely reject the true null (i.e. 퐻N푗:휑푗 = 0	) in favour of the alternative and exist among 
푅W. On the other hand, 푅W portrays the number of rules rejecting the 퐻N푗, in a two-tailed test, 
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and their performance metric 휑푗 is positive. The estimate of FDR+ is given by 퐹퐷푅YW = 퐹ZW 푅ZW[  
where 퐹ZW and 푅ZW are the estimators of 퐹Wand 푅W, respectively7. For example, an FDR+ of 
100% conveys that no trading strategy genuinely outperforms the benchmark, while any 
existing performance can be purely attributed to chance. In general, the FDR produces a 
sensible trade-off between true positives and false selections, while it is less conservative than 
the FWER measure in terms of power. Because of this less conservative nature, the FDR 
method has the advantage of selecting outperforming rules even if the best rule is not significant 
in terms of performance.  
We can estimate the frequency of false discoveries or the number of lucky rules, 퐹W, in the 
right tail of the distribution of performance metrics, 휑푗 at a given significance level 훾 as:  
퐹ZW = 휋N ∗ 푙 ∗ 훾/2 
where 휋N is the proportion of rules satisfying the null hypothesis, 휑푗 = 0, in the entire 
population, 푙 is the number of the entire population and 훾/2 is the probability of a positive non-
genuine rule exhibiting luck due to symmetry conditions.  
 
4.2 Issues regarding False Discovery Rate Existing Methods  
Before describing our proposed approach, we provide a discussion of possible issues arising 
in both the multiple hypothesis set-up and the control of FDR in this section. Benjamini and 
Hochberg’s original idea about FDR (1995) assumes that the multiple hypotheses tested are 
independent of each other. However, a considerable number of trading rules in our sample are 
just small variations of themselves. For example, moving averages are highly correlated since 
we consider only slightly different parameters during their construction. Efforts have been 
made to provide evidence for “weak dependence” conditions of the test statistics under which 
the FDR approach holds (Benjamini and Yekutiely, 2001; Storey, 2003; Storey and Tibshirani, 
2003; Storey et al., 2004; Farconemi, 2007; Wu, 2008). Most of them show that this happens 
when the number of tests increases to infinity with dependence effects diminishing to zero due 
to asymptotics. Likewise, in our empirical investigation the technical trading rules display 
dependence within specific classes (i.e. moving averages), while each class is independent of 
each other (i.e. different families of rules). For this purpose, we also need to confirm whether 
                                                             
7 Similarly, the ]^&  and J^&  correspond to the estimators of the proportion of false discoveries (]&) and alternative 
rules (J&) generating negative performance (i.e., _` < 0).  
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a weak dependence condition holds for our discrete FDR framework before we move forward 
to construct it as well as test the behaviour of our FDR approach under cross-sectional 
dependences in a Monte Carlo simulation. 
Another important issue arises when we have to perform hypothesis testing in a large 
number of t-statistics, usually numbering in the thousands, while the number of observations 
is relatively small, as it is in our case. Specifically, we utilize more than 21,000 technical 
trading rules over an IS horizon of two years (i.e. 504 observations). Bootstrapping procedures, 
as mentioned above, are commonly used in these cases to calculate the corresponding p-values 
and so to perform hypothesis testing, due to the fact that they require few distributional 
assumptions and are robust to outliers. Performing a resampling procedure on each trading rule 
though, generates p-values which are discrete rather than continuous because of the finite 
number of bootstraps employed. This leads to the detection of large-scale homogeneous 
discrete p-values, sharing the same support points. Previous studies either controlling FDR or 
FWER overcome this issue by assuming that the true null p-values are continuous and follow 
a uniform distribution as described above (Storey, 2002; Storey et al., 2004; Romano and Wolf, 
2005; Romano and Wolf, 2007; Barras et al., 2010; Brajgowicz and Scaillet, 2012). However, 
the true null discrete p-values tend to be stochastically larger than uniformly distributed and 
the direct application of existing methods to them can cause several misspecifications (Pounds 
and Cheng, 2006). 
Moreover, in a two-sided test and for continuous true null p-values uniformly distributed, it 
holds Pr(푝− value ≤ 훾) = 훾 for all	훾 ∈ [0,1]. On the other hand, for the discrete ones we 
observe only a certain number of support points for the 푝− 푣푎푙푢푒푠	(i.e. 푉 = {훾', … , 훾푣, 훾푣W'} 
with 0 < 훾' < ⋯ < 훾푣, < 훾푣W' ≡ 1) with potentially many ties, which satisfy a discrete 
uniform condition such that Pr(푝− value ≤ 훾) = 훾, for	훾 ∈ (0,1] and only for 훾 ∈ 푉. Using 
bootstrapping techniques to compute the associated p-values for each rule, we end up with p-
values satisfying a discrete condition with common support points. To illustrate further, every 
p-value is usually calculated by comparing the value of each performance metric with the value 
of its corresponding quantiles of bootstrapped metrics (Sullivan et al., 1999). This means that 
large values of observed test statistics provide evidence against the null and the corresponding 
p-values are given as 푝푗 = '퐵∑ (퐵푖8' 휑푗푏 ≥ 휑푗), where 퐵 is the number of bootstrap replications, 
while 휑푗푏 is the test statistic calculated for the 푏th bootstrap for the 푗th rule and 휑푗 is the realized 
test statistic. P-values computed this way are attached with support points in the form: 푉 =
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, 1l,	which also verify a discrete nature. Thus, providing an FDR framework, 
which takes into account larger discrete p-values (opposite to smaller, continuous ones) might 
help improve existing methods further. 
Another issue appears in the calculation of 휆 parameter and so in the estimation process of 
휋N, which is the key estimator for controlling FDR. Generally, poor selection of λ can cause 
unnecessary conservativeness in 휋N? and 퐹퐷푅Y . For example, not all values of 휆	 ∈ [0,1) 
generate ideal 휋N? estimates under a discrete set-up, contrary to what usually happens in a 
continuous framework. Imagine a candidate set of λ, 퐿 = {휆N, 휆', … , 휆푣} with	휆N ≡ 0. We can 
show that, if we arbitrarily select λ from 퐿 for some fixed value 푞	 ∈ {0, … , 푣} based on a 
support point, then 휋N?(휆) is a conservative estimator of 휋N. On the other hand, if 휆 does not 
belong to this set but lies in between two support points (e.g. 휆푖 < 휆 < 휆푖W')), then choosing 
휋N?(휆) > 	휋N?(휆푖), can lead to an extra and unnecessary conservativeness in the estimation of 
proportion of rules with no abnormal performance (Harvey and Liu, 2018). 
In terms of choosing λ, a small value can lead to estimators with a large positive bias, while 
a high value of λ leaves only a small number of p-values on its right-hand side to estimate 휋N, 
yielding an increase in the variance of estimators. Thus, we should always achieve a good trade-
off between the two when choosing λ. Previous literature follows a common approach to 
choosing λ under a continuous set-up, visually examining the histogram of all p-values and 
setting the λ parameter equal to the support point above which the number of occurrences of p-
values becomes fairly flat or selecting an arbitrary value (most commonly λ=0.6 based on the 
suggestion of Brajgowicz and Scaillet, 2012). The rationale is based on the assumption that 
bootstrapped p-values share equally spaced support points and each support contains a uniform 
number of true null p-values.  
As mentioned above, previous studies conclude that the conservativeness of 휋N? holds for 
almost every fixed λ approximately satisfying this condition. However, we find in our extensive 
Monte Carlo simulation that 휋N?(휆) is sensitive to some extent to the choice of 휆, a finding that 
is contrary to previous evidence produced by Brajgowicz and Scaillet (2012) and in agreement 
with the simulations of Harvey and Liu (2018)8. Furthermore, such a technique might also 
                                                             
8 Brajgowicz and Scaillet (2012) explored three values, λ=0.4, 0.6 and 0.8. The authors found the value 0.6 to be 
optimal and they note that their results are not sensitive on the choice of λ and their exercise on the DJIA index. 
Harvey and Liu (2018) with a similar application that explores the same set of values for λ (0.4, 0.6 and 0.8), 
produce results that are sensitive to the choice of λ on Standard and Poor's Capital IQ database. On their database 
the optimal value of λ is 0.8. In our application where we study multiple series, we also note that the results are 
sensitive to the choice of λ and that its optimal value in our approach differs between the series and periods.  
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involve an extra bias depending on how the researcher interprets a specific level of a 
histogram’s flatness. For the above reasons, we concentrate in the next section on selecting λ 
dynamically, as a fixed quantile of p-values, based on the data characteristics, to minimize any 
conservativeness that may be undesired by the estimators.  
Finally, MHT frameworks are computationally demanding most of the time, since they 
involve bootstrapping procedures. Moreover, the FDR approach requires setting the tuning 
parameter by taking into account the graphical representation of p-values, which considerably 
increases the computation time needed for controlling FDR. Our proposed dynamic approach 
is computationally more efficient in terms of both time and selecting the outperforming rules 
based on an algorithmic set-up, which can also help practitioners make better decisions in 
portfolio construction and OOS estimation. 
 
4.3 DFDR+/- 
We now present our novel specification DFDR+/- accounting for homogeneous discrete p-
values, while providing different estimates of the proportion of false selections for 
outperforming and underperforming rules. However, since our aim is to identify the significant 
outperforming rules only, we will focus on the estimation of DFDR+ for the rest of this paper. 
In general, our study is the first in the field of finance to propose an adaptive FDR approach 
employing a dynamic parameterization, while considering discrete p-values as a tool for 
controlling data snooping. 
Our approach concentrates on large-scale homogeneous discrete p-values. Following 
Kulinskaya and Lewin (2009), we assume that using bootstrapping procedures as described in 
Section 4.2, we acquire discrete p-values which satisfy a uniform condition, while sharing the 
same discrete support 푉. Furthermore, we need to consider as 푁 = {푛', … , 푛푣W'} the number of 
occurrences of each element in 푉, i.e. 푛푖 = #{푝푗 = 훾푖} for 푖 = 1,… , 푠+ 1 in order to express 
the empirical distribution of the computed p-values. Thus, the empirical distribution of 
homogeneous discrete p-values with common support points is totally explained by (푉,푁). 
Coming to the FDR approach calculation, the 퐹W, 푅W and FDR+ also represent step functions 
with possible change points at the support points. Then it is sufficient simply to acquire their 
values at the specific support points to control the FDR9. Given that, the distribution function 
                                                             
9 Suppose that L is a time-running parameter from zero to one, then the continuous time processes ]W, JW and 
FDR+ relax to discrete stochastic process on the support points. 
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of the null discrete p-values on every support point is identical with that of continuous p-values, 
which is the key evidence in developing a parallel method for discrete p-values based on similar 
dynamic set-ups for continuous p-values. 
We now explain our new approach to improving the FDR+/- methodology to accommodate 
for discrete p-values, while dynamically selecting λ under a stopping time rule, similar to 
viewing the time running forward. We define this stopping time condition as the point which 
holds 퐸[휋N? n훾푞o] ≥ 휋N				, while q is the exact stopping time with respect to 푛푖 (for 푖 = 0,… , 푠), 
which is the history of p-values up to 훾푞, when 푞 = 푖. We also determine the whole procedure 
up to the stopping time 푞, as {0 ≡ 푛N, … , 푛푖}.	Then we just set 휆 equal to 훾푞. We check every 
support point instead of checking every single p-value for the stopping condition. If q is an 
appropriate stopping time, it must also hold 퐸[퐹퐷푅Y n훾푞o] ≥ 퐹퐷푅, where 퐹퐷푅	Y is the 
estimation of the actual FDR provided by our method. The rationale for this approach is related 
to the idea of discovering the smallest support point, in which the number of appearances of p-
values, 푛푖, to each right-hand side is almost equal. However, the stopping time condition is very 
general since we can construct numerous stopping time rules fulfilling the above criteria, while 
the actual right-hand side counts are unobservable, setting hurdles in the computation of the 
stopping time approach. It is already known that employing a right boundary procedure, such 
as the one introduced by Liang and Nettleton (2012) for continuous p-values solves this issue 
by only taking into account the average of the remaining counts. In general, the right-boundary 
specification guarantees conservative estimators for 휋N and FDR depending on a grid of 
candidate points for λ in line with data characteristics and a stopping time condition, at least 
for a continuous framework (Liang and Nettleton, 2012). We adopt the same procedure for 
discrete p-values. In addition to this, the right boundary procedure performs effectively for both 
independent and weakly dependent p-values, as observed in our case (see Liang and Nettleton, 
2012; Liang, 2016). Liang and Nettleton (2012) and Liang (2016) provide evidence of 
computing an FDR estimator using the right boundary procedure, while certain limits exist. 
Their results clearly satisfy a special case of the weak dependence condition of Storey et al. 
(2004). 
The aim of the right boundary procedure is to find the first 휆, at which the values of 휋N?(휆) stop 
decreasing, satisfying in that way the stopping time condition. For this reason, we consider a 
candidate set for 휆, 훬 = {휆', . . , 휆푛}, in which we place its components in ascending order, 0 ≡
휆N < 휆' <. . . < 휆푛 < 휆푛W' ≡ 1 (and 휆 ⊆ 훬). Then we select the best 휆, as the minimum 휆푞, 
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which fulfils the condition 휋N?(휆푖) ≥ 휋N?(휆푖&'), (i.e. 푞 = min	{1 ≤ 푖 ≤ 푛− 1 ∶ 	휋N?(휆푖) ≥
휋N?(휆푖&')} ). Specifically, we use the set 훬 to separate the interval between zero and one, (0,1], 
into 푛+ 1 bins with the i-th bin being (휆푖&', 휆푖] for 푖	 ∈ {1, … , 푛+ 1} and 푤푖 = #{푝푗 ∈(휆푖&', 휆푖] } being the number of p-values in the i-th bin. Assuming equal intervals between 휆s, 
this approach practically chooses the right boundary of the first bin whose number of p-values 
is no larger than the average of the corresponding number to its right. In this way, we achieve 
the stopping condition when the downward trend of the number of p-values in each bin is 
neutralized, as we move forward, to a level where the random variants of rest p-values are fairly 
equal. Finally, acquiring the optimal 휆 in this way, we can easily calculate a conservative 
estimator for 휋N based on Storey’s formula (2002) as has already been mentioned in previous 
sections. 
The rest of the steps for the selection of outperforming rules remain similar to those of Barras 
et al. (2010) in the FDR specification. In terms of bootstrapping, we generate 1,000 sequence 
replications, and we retain the same bootstrap draw of the time series sample period for each 
trading rule’s returns. In this way, we actually bootstrap the cross-section of trading rules 
returns through time in order to preserve the cross-sectional dependencies (Kosowski et al., 
2006; Fama and French, 2010; Yan and Zheng, 2016). The application of stationary bootstrap 
also allows us to preserve the autocorrelations in returns structures. We then use the “point 
estimates” procedure of Storey et al. (2004) on generated p-values, under weak dependence to 
select the outperforming rules, while setting a target for false discoveries. We can also 
extrapolate the proportion of trading rules displaying non-zero performance as 휋훢 = 1 − 휋N in 
the entire universe of technical trading rules by using the FDR approach. This may be useful 
for an investor who wants to divide 휋훢 into the proportions of positive, 휋퐴W, and negative, 휋퐴&, 
rules in the population. The former includes both alternative rules generating positive 
performance and rejecting the null (푝− 푣푎푙푢푒 < 훾) as well as those with positive performance 
but not rejecting the null (푝− 푣푎푙푢푒 > 훾 ). The latter include those relevant for rules showing 
negative performance. We describe in Appendix A the precise steps for achieving this, the 
estimation of λ and 휋N?, as well as the computation of 휋퐴W and 휋퐴& in . In our Monte Carlo 
simulation, also presented in Appendix A, we provide evidence that our discrete right boundary 
FDR procedure achieves a good trade-off between the bias and variance in various weakly 
dependent settings. We also compare the performance of the proposed procedure relative to the 
established FDR procedure of Storey et al. (2004) as well as the StepM test (RW) of Romano 
and Wolf (2005). 
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4.4 DFDR portfolio construction 
We construct a portfolio of technical trading rules by setting the 퐷퐹퐷푅Y W target (the 
estimated DFDR for outperforming rules only) to 10%, which achieves a good trade-off 
between wrongly chosen rules and truly outperforming ones. In particular, our Monte Carlo 
simulations reveal stability when 퐷퐹퐷푅Y W levels range from 5% to 30%. For our 10%-DFDR+ 
portfolio, only 10% of the rules selected do not have genuine profitability among the 
outperforming rules, while 90% possess significant predictability. Moreover, we use the 
forecast averaging technique and allocate equal weight to the signals pooled from the chosen 
rules at each time-step in order to construct and calculate the portfolio returns. Since each 
trading rule might generate a long, short or neutral signal at a single time-step, we invest an 
equal proportion of our wealth in the signals and their corresponding returns generated by each 
individual rule, similar to calculating their equally-weighted cross-sectional mean. 
Following previous studies (see among others, Brock et al., 1992; Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 
2012), a trading position is opened when a long or short signal is produced and liquidated when 
the signal is either reversed or neutralized. Should a neutral position be raised, the proportional 
wealth is assumed to be invested in the risk-free asset or the saving account. The gross daily 
return is calculated by the change in the closing value of the underlying index. A one-way 
transaction cost is deducted from the gross return when a position is terminated. The excess 
return is then estimated, to compare the profitability of the trading rules with the risk-free rate.  
 
5. IS Performance 
This section provides an ex post analysis for the technical rules. In Section 5.1 the number 
of strategies identified as genuinely profitable for the two-year look-back period, their relevant 
profitability and a disaggregated analysis of the types of trading rules that are profitable is 
presented. Section 5.2 reports their corresponding break-even transaction cost analysis. The 
relevant results based on one-year IS are presented in Appendix B.1.  
5.1 Identification, IS Profitability and Disaggregation Analysis 
Table 2 presents the percentage and standard deviations of the survivor rules identified by 
our 10%-DFDR+/- portfolios. The look-back period is set to two years and the portfolios are 
readjusted on a monthly basis. 
[Table 2 here] 
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We note that the percentage of identified rules varies over the years and from market to 
market. The higher number of identified rules are found in the UK, Russia and the Frontier 
markets indices. There is no obvious trend in the percentage of identified rules over the years. 
The peaks are in 2006, 2009 and 2010 while the lowest is in 2012. It is interesting to note that 
our procedure selects profitable rules for all indices and all years. The relevant trading 
performance of the portfolios generated during the look-back period is presented in Table 3. 
[Table 3 here] 
There is a significant profitability pattern after transaction costs for all indices. Emerging 
markets present an increased profitability compared to their counterparts in terms of annualized 
return. There is no obvious trend in the profitability of technical analysis. There is a peak in 
terms of annualized returns for the years 2009 and 2010 and consistent stable Sharpe ratios for 
all years. There is also no connection between the percentage of identified rules and the trading 
performance of the generated portfolios. 
Table 4 reports a disaggregated analysis of the classes of trading rules that are profitable 
(i.e., RSIs, filter rules, moving averages, support and resistance and channel breakouts) in every 
single market based on the findings of Table 2. In Table 4 we present the average percentages 
of the families of rules that are profitable across all years (i.e. 2006-2015) when the lookback 
period is set to two years and the portfolios are readjusted on a monthly basis10. 
[Table 4 here] 
It is obvious that moving averages dominate their counterparts across all markets. The 
second largest family of genuine profitable rules is that of support and resistance. We note that 
contrarian rules (RSI) present considerably lower percentages for all markets under study (with 
the notably exception of Jordan and UK). It seems that all markets under study are characterized 
by momentum and strong trends. Our results extend the findings of Chan et al. (1997), 
Jegadeesh (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) who find profitability on momentum 
trading strategies on US and European stocks.  
 
5.2 Break-even Transaction Costs 
In this section, we perform a break-even analysis of the excess profitability of technical 
trading rules over the look-back period. Following relevant studies in the field (see among 
                                                             
10 A more detailed disaggregated analysis of the classes of trading rules that are profitable for every single year 
and market is available on Appendix B.2.  
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others, Bessembinder and Chan, 1998; Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012; Hsu et al., 2016), we 
adopt as the break-even cost the level of one-way transaction cost, which makes the excess 
profitability (i.e. mean return) of the best-performing technical trading rule diminish to zero. 
The more the break-even costs surpass the actual costs, the more robust a rule’s excess 
profitability is deemed to be. 
Figure 1 displays the size of average break-even transaction costs for the best-performing 
technical trading rule under the Sharpe ratio metric and for each index separately. We select the 
best-performing rule for every month based on the two-year look-back period that acts as the 
IS11. Then the procedure is repeated for each of the 12 months in every year, while rebalancing 
is performed. The average break-even transaction cost per year is estimated by dividing the sum 
of the best rule’s monthly break-even transaction costs by twelve. The same procedure for the 
overall 10-year period is applied.  
 [Figure 1 here] 
The major trend revealed by the figure is that frontier markets achieve the highest break-
even transaction costs, followed by the emerging and advanced markets respectively, at least 
for the first four years. In particular, Morocco (up to 38%), Russia (up to 43%) and Brazil (up 
to 41%) dominate in terms of excess profitability robustness over that period, while on the other 
hand an advanced market such as Japan (up to 52%) reports the highest break-even costs over 
2009 and 2011. For the rest of the study periods, there is a decay of break-even transaction 
costs, except from 2014, from which point the advanced markets recover compared to the rest. 
For instance, the break-even transaction costs of the corresponding advanced markets’ index as 
well as the US span from 14% to 20%. Of course, there are still some emerging (i.e. Russia and 
Brazil) and frontier (i.e. Estonia and Morocco) markets, which score similar or even higher 
break-even costs. 
In general, we observe a downward trend of break-even costs and so excess profitability over 
the years, costs reaching their lowest levels in recent years and especially in 2015. However, 
this trend is not always stable. Specifically, most of the countries exhibit high break-even costs 
in 2006, facing a small decay in 2007, while they recover to higher levels from 2008 to 2010, 
years during which they also reach a characteristic peak. During the following years there is a 
considerable decay in their size, with a slight recovery only in 2014, which does not clearly 
remain in 2015. So, apart from the years in which break-even costs report their highest values 
                                                             
11 The corresponding break-even transaction costs using one year as IS reported in Appendix B.3 reveal lower 
break-even transaction costs in general. However, the major trends found in Figure 1 remain. 
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(i.e. 2008-2010), there is a somewhat consistent performance of technical trading rules 
especially in recent periods. 
 
6. OOS Analysis 
This section provides a comprehensive analysis of the portfolios constructed on the surviving 
rules of the DFDR+ procedure with an ex-ante approach. Section 6.1 presents the excess 
profitability of the DFDR+ portfolios over the OOS. Section 6.2 studies performance persistence 
by measuring the number of periods a DFDR+ portfolio can generate a return above the risk-
free rate. In Section 6.3, a novel cross-validation practice is provided that considers both IS and 
OOS and preserves the order of the underlying time series. Finally, Section 6.4 focuses on 
interpreting the excess returns of the portfolio over the different period by considering the level 
of financial stress in markets. 
 
6.1 Profitability 
Following previous studies in the field, we employ an OOS experiment based on the 
performance of significant technical trading rules IS. We create portfolios of outperforming 
trading rules for each index, based on their IS significance, and we evaluate them in OOS. We 
consider three OOS periods of one, three and six months, following a two-year look-back 
period12. For the one-month post-sample period for example, we select the significantly positive 
rules based on their performance over the previous two years and under the 10%-DFDR+ 
approach as a portfolio construction tool (see Section 4.4). Then the portfolios’ performance is 
evaluated in the following one-month period. We rebalance our DFDR+/- portfolio every month 
in a rolling-forward structure over a year and we repeat the same procedure for all the years in 
our sample (i.e. 2006-2015). In this way we dynamically build and evaluate our portfolios just 
as an active investor would in practice. We utilize the OOS periods of three and six months 
respectively, in a similar manner. 
Table 5 reports the average excess annualized mean return and Sharpe ratio (in parenthesis)13 
for every index, using a two-year look-back period as IS and one month as OOS over the full 
                                                             
12 We also set the IS period covering one year, but the corresponding portfolios of significant rules perform slightly 
worse than those constructed under a two-year IS period. The relevant tables and discussion are provided in 
Appendix B.4. 
13 We observe similar trends (time-varying profitability) with the Sortino ratio and the manipulation ratio. These 
results are available upon request. The results presented in Table 5 are the averages of 12 consecutive experiments 
for each year. This procedure and the fact that our OOS is short (even in the 3- and 6-month cases presented in 
the Appendix) validates the discussion that follows, irrespective of the performance metric.    
24 
 
sample of ten years after transaction costs. Both annualized mean excess returns and Sharpe 
ratios presented are calculated as the corresponding OOS averages of twelve portfolios of 
significantly profitable outperforming rules built for every index after rolling forward the IS by 
one month during a year. 
[Table 5 here] 
OOS evidence shows that technical trading rules perform quite well for the majority of the 
markets considered during the earlier periods (i.e. 2006, 2007), with the performance of 
emerging markets being more profound. Focusing now on the following years and especially 
2008 and 2009, almost all markets present extraordinary performances. 2008 and 2009 
correspond to the global financial crisis period, during which most of the markets faced extreme 
downward trends and so severe losses. This environment seems beneficial for our technical 
trading rules’ universe, as it consisted mainly of momentum rules exploiting such big trends. 
This also explains the negative performance for most trading practices in 2010, which was a 
turning point for most of the markets. Additionally, the limited profitability of our DFDR+/- 
portfolios continues to a certain extent for the following years, and then it recovers for the more 
recent periods. Profitability over recent years (i.e. 2013-2015) is evident mostly in some 
advanced and emerging markets. When it comes to the comparison of the overall performance 
among markets, frontier markets provide a more solid investment option over the full sample 
period, generating positive mean returns and Sharpe ratios for the majority of the years, with 
second and third best being emerging and advanced markets respectively. Our general finding 
though, is that the profitability of technical trading rules is variable across the years examined 
and technical analysis can exploit short-term market inefficiencies.  
Tables 6 and 7 display the annualized average excess mean returns and Sharpe ratios (in 
parenthesis) after transaction costs for every index using the two-year look-back period as IS 
but this time three-month and six-month OOS periods are applied, respectively. Once again 
both reported measures have been computed as the OOS averages of the corresponding twelve 
monthly portfolios per annum for every index in a three- and six-month rolling-forward 
structure, respectively.  
[Table 6 here] 
[Table 7 here] 
As in the case of using one month as the OOS period, there is considerable evidence of 
excess profitability of technical trading rules during the earlier years, but this is now mainly 
concentrated on the emerging markets and only on a few of them. The outperformance reaches 
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its highest level once again in 2008, with more than half of the indices switching to negative 
returns in 2009. This might be a result of the longer term OOS periods examined and so less 
frequent adjustment to new trends. Once again, the performance of technical trading rules 
diminishes over the upcoming periods, but technical analysis is still able to predict quite well 
some of the advanced market indices in very recent years, in terms of mean excess returns and 
Sharpe ratios. This may indicate specific patterns in market trends during these years, which 
are exploited by technical trading rules. Frontier markets still seem a good investment 
opportunity, with the emerging ones to follow across the years, even though the OOS period 
has now increased. 
The previous results highlight the effectiveness of technical analysis in exploiting short-term 
market inefficiencies. As the OOS is increased, the profitability of our rules decreases, which 
is justified from both applications setting the look-back period to one (see Appendix B.1) and 
two years respectively. Such a result happens naturally as market efficiency eliminates any 
profitability and/or the underlying trends dominating the stock markets change. These findings 
can also explain parts of the past literature in the field of technical analysis and their 
profitability. Previous researchers have tended to examine long periods (see among others, 
Sullivan et al., 1999; Qi and Wu, 2006; Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012; Hsu et al., 2016). As 
our empirical exercise highlights, the profitability of specific technical rules is short-term and 
varies across periods. Rules that survive for long periods naturally do not exist due to market 
efficiency. The profitability of specific technical rules seems short-term and adaptiveness might 
be the key.  
 
6.2 Performance Persistence 
In the previous section, we focused on identifying profitable technical rules with DFDR+/- 
and examining the trading performance of the generated portfolios. As discussed, it seems that 
technical rules and our approach are able to exploit short-term market inefficiencies. However, 
market efficiency should diminish any profitability sooner or later. It will be interesting to see 
how fast this profitability decays and whether there are differences between different markets 
and periods. This element is overlooked in the related literature, where the empirical evaluation 
is static and limited to specific periods. In real-world trading environments, practitioners are 
adaptive and rebalance their portfolios on a frequent basis.      
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Table 8 presents the persistence of our generated portfolios for the two-year look-back period 
(IS) and for the OOS one-month case. We measure persistence as the consecutive OOS months 
for which our portfolios have a trading performance above the relevant risk-free rate.    
[Table 8 here] 
We note that in the vast majority of cases, traders need to rebalance portfolios on more than 
a monthly basis. These results are expected, considering the level of efficiency of financial 
markets and the mediocre trading performance of our trading rules as outlined in the previous 
section. However, it should be noted that there is a handful of cases where the measured 
robustness is higher than one month. In other words, there are cases where market efficiency 
was weak enough to allow profitability for static portfolios. Persistence is higher for 2007 and 
2008, an observation that can be attributed to the turbulence created by the global financial 
crisis and its side-effects on market efficiency. Interestingly, the market with the higher 
persistence is the US, the largest and most liquid index under study. In Table 9, we repeat the 
same exercise for the two-year look-back period and OOS three-month case.  
[Table 9 here] 
Persistence is decreased for most cases and years. We note that in 2008 the average 
persistence of our portfolios is more than 1. Else, our portfolios retain their profitability after 
the first three months in OOS. Considering specific markets, we note that the US retains a 
persistence larger than the OOS on average, which is consistent with previous findings. This is 
surprising, as one might expect frontier and emerging markets to have stronger persistence than 
advanced markets. Table 10 presents the same exercise for the two-year look-back period and 
six-month OOS. 
[Table 10 here] 
From Table 10, we observe that persistence is further decreased. There are years (especially 
for frontier markets) where persistence is 0. This means that none of the generated portfolios in 
these years have a trading performance higher than the relevant risk-free rate on the first six 
months of the OOS. Similarly, with the previous two cases, we note a peak for the year 2008. 
The results above highlight the importance of rebalancing in trading. We note that there are 
a few cases where the portfolios might have negative profitability in the first month of the OOS, 
but some of them bounce back in the following periods (see for example, persistence for 2008 
in Tables 8 to 10). In these cases, adaptiveness seems not to always lead to increased profits, 
while patience is rewarded. However, the majority of the results highlight the importance of 
rebalancing portfolios. Emerging and frontier markets do not seem to offer a safe haven for 
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static portfolios. The observed trends allow us to note that persistence is stronger at the peak of 
the global financial crisis of 2008. These results lead us to further explore whether financial 
stress levels affect the profitability of technical analysis (see Section 6.4). This exercise also 
can be seen to show how adaptive a trader needs to be and how persistent the profitability of 
technical rules is. This choice can also be seen as a trade-off between Type I and Type II errors 
on the modelling part (Harvey and Liu, 2015), which is further examined in the next section.  
 
6.3 Cross-validation 
Splitting the data into IS and OOS plays an important role in the OOS profitability of 
technical analysis (see Sections 6.1 and 6.2).When only a small IS part out of the full sample 
data is retained for testing, the trading strategies that will be employed OOS, then it is highly 
possible for true discoveries to be missed (i.e. false negatives) (Harvey and Liu, 2015). Also, 
we are interested in identifying technical trading rules that are significant not only in IS but also 
in OOS. To validate that technical analysis has value in practice, we need to check whether 
technical rules exist that are profitable in the OOS and significant in both the IS and OOS.     
Hence in this section we re-assess the robustness of our OOS performance in an innovative 
way based on a cross-validation experiment. In particular, we explore a method proposed by 
Harvey and Liu (2015), which involves a combination of full sample and the IS-OOS evidence 
in order to search for the intersection of survivors. Assuming that our IS period (i.e. two years) 
is not too short compared to the corresponding OOS periods (i.e. one, three and six months, 
respectively) we retain our IS-OOS test results computed previously. These involve the genuine 
technical trading rules which survived in OOS in terms of profitability (positive returns). At the 
same time, we employ the DFDR+/- method to select the significantly positive rules for a full 
sample horizon with a more lenient target rate (i.e. 20%). We consider three full sample periods 
corresponding to each of the three different OOS periods examined plus the IS period, while 
we utilize the aggregate data set each time (e.g. two years and one-month full sample in the first 
case). Finally, we merge the findings observed by the IS-OOS and the full sample simulations 
in order to identify the potential intersection of significant rules provided by the two 
approaches. Then we evaluate the performance of the rules belonging in the intersection. As far 
as we are aware, this is the first time such an approach has been adopted. 
Tables 11-13 report the results of the cross-validation test as described above. In particular, 
the average OOS annualized mean excess returns of twelve cross-validated portfolios are 
constructed in a similar way to the previous sections after accounting for transaction costs. The 
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average percentage of cross-validated rules in terms of the genuine significant rules, such as 
those identified in section 5.1, is also reported in parenthesis. 
 
[Table 11 here] 
Table 11 reveals the results of our cross-validation exercise for the one-month OOS case. 
Profitability is excessively high, especially during the global financial crisis (i.e. 2008-2009). 
For the remaining periods, emerging market indices demonstrate the highest performance and 
report very healthy returns with only a slight decay during the most recent years. The frontier 
markets indices exhibit similar patterns. For advanced markets indices, the performance of 
technical trading rules seems promising over most periods, while the returns yielded are quite 
low compared to those in advanced and frontier markets. Positive profitability was naturally 
expected, as cross-validated rules are a subset of the profitable OOS rules. The percentages of 
cross-validated rules vary considerably. For advanced indices these numbers span from 0.01% 
to 17.41% (i.e. both for the US) of the genuine IS rules, while indices for emerging markets 
range from 0.01% (i.e. China, Brazil) to 18.07% (i.e. China) across all periods. Moreover, the 
relevant percentages of cross-validating rules for frontier indices spread from 0.01% (i.e. 
Morocco, Jordan) to 18.14% (i.e. Morocco). On average, the percentage across all markets and 
periods is 2.47% of the related survivors presented in Table 2. The actual number of the rules 
is small (on average there are 30 rules), compared to the trading rules universe (i.e. 21,195). 
However, as noted before, the purpose of the exercise is to study whether technical analysis has 
any value in trading. The trading rules’ universe considered is well diversified in terms of 
characteristics and parameters. In reality, practitioners take into account all available IS 
information and select a subset of rules based on this knowledge. For example, a trader may not 
consider any contrarian rules (i.e. RSIs) for OOS prediction in strong bearish/bullish periods 
such as the global financial crisis (i.e. 2008-2009). In other words, the question is whether there 
are rules that can survive the cross-validation exercise (if any) and not how many there are. The 
answer to that from our exercise is yes, since it finds that short-term market inefficiencies that 
can lead to profitability exist, and technical rules can exploit them. Table 12 presents the results 
of our exercise for the three-month OOS case. 
 [Table 12 here] 
We observe the same characteristics in technical trading rules performance; however, the 
magnitude of generated returns is smaller compared to the ones obtained in the one-month OOS 
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period. The percentage of cross-validated rules is at the same level as in the previous case. Table 
13 presents the six-month OOS case. 
 [Table 13 here] 
The evidence provided by performing the cross-validation experiment in a six-month OOS 
horizon reveals even lower returns compared to the relevant ones using one and three months 
across all indices and over all post-sample periods. This finding is consistent with the one in 
Section 6.1 describing the generic OOS results, due to the fact that the significant rules are 
exposed to longer post-sample periods with different trends.  
The findings of this section reveal that genuine profitable technical rules exist, and technical 
analysis still has value in trading. Our DFDR+/- approach is capable of identifying subsets of 
these rules as demonstrated in Section 6.2. The percentages of cross-validated rules might seem 
small, but it is worth recalling that the scope of this section is to check whether truly profitable 
rules in both the IS and OOS do actually exist. These results can also be seen as the performance 
of an oracle trader that applies technical rules in our data set.   
 
6.4 Financial Stress 
In the previous sections, we noted a peak in the performance of technical rules for the years 
2008 and 2009 that correspond to the recent global financial crisis. The performance of our 
portfolios deteriorates in the following years, but there are still cases where they present excess 
profitability after transaction costs even in advanced markets. Our results contradict the 
previous recent literature that finds no recent excess profitability after transaction costs for 
technical analysis (see among others, Hsu et al., 2010; Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012 and 
Taylor, 2014)14. These authors argue that the popularity of exchange-traded funds, algorithmic 
trading, market liquidity, derivatives or the effect of other macroeconomic factors have 
eliminated excess profitability in recent years. Although the effect of these factors cannot be 
rejected, our results guide us to explore the effect of financial stress on our portfolios.  
In order to explore the effect of financial stress on our portfolios, we need first to measure 
it. The literature is rich in financial stress indices. The difference between them is based on the 
                                                             
14 As discussed before, none of the previous literature presents such an extensive empirical application as the one 
presented here. Previous studies also applied more conservative and time-consuming MHT frameworks and 
limited their empirical applications to specific years or periods. For example, let us consider the case of the MSCI 
US index, the 2-year IS and 1-month OOS (see Table 5). If our application was limited only to 2014 or 2015, our 
interpretation would be anti-diametrical. The flexibility and adaptiveness of DFDR+/- along with recent 
developments in computational power allowed us to conduct an empirical analysis that unveils previously 
unknown patterns.    
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components that are used to construct them, their frequency and the market to which they are 
applied. In our study, we apply the Office of Financial Research (OFR) stress indices. They are 
constructed based on 33 market financial variables and cover the US, other advanced economies 
and emerging markets15. We match our findings for the US, Advanced and Emerging markets 
indices from Section 6.1 with the stress levels as reported by the related US, other advanced16 
and emerging markets OFR stress indices. Below we present the performance of our portfolios 
under high and low financial market stress17. 
[Table 14 here] 
We note that the trading performance of technical rules is considerably better when financial 
stress is high in emerging and other advanced markets. The annualized returns are five to six 
times higher in the high than the low period. This finding is consistent with the evidence found 
in Smith et al., (2018) where the authors demonstrate that technical analysis is relatively more 
useful in high-sentiment periods. During high-sentiment periods, financial markets exhibit 
stronger trends which can be captured by momentum based technical trading rules. The OFR 
stress index is based on series of indicators that capture financial market sentiment18.   
For US, we observe the opposite trend. The average profitability of technical rules over the 
10-year period of study is positive in the US when stress levels are low and negative when stress 
levels are high. The US market is the most liquid and the biggest in terms of capitalization from 
the ones under study. It seems that under high financial stress periods, investors seek safe 
heaven to safer assets, switch to more complex algorithmic trading models or move to other 
markets. Our results can be explained by the level of sophistication of traders in US markets 
compared to their alternatives. In general, we note that financial stress seems to be an important 
factor in the performance of technical analysis, but its effect seems to depend on the relevant 
characteristics of the market.  
 
                                                             
15 Other indices (such as the St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index and the Kansas City Financial Stress Index) 
focus on a specific index while others stop before our sample (such as the International Monetary Fund stress 
index). Our criteria to select the index are to cover as many markets as possible from those under study and to 
ensure that all indices have been constructed with the same methodology.  
16 We note that the MSCI and the OFR indices do not correspond to each other perfectly. For example, the “other 
advanced” OFR index does not include the US. However, amongst the highest cited financial stress indices, OFR 
is the closest to our study.  
17 The OFR financial stress indices have a daily frequency and are volatile in certain periods. We examine only 
the 1-month OOS case as we are interested in measuring the effect of previous stress levels at the highest possible 
frequency.  
18 For a list of the OFR financial stress index sources see,  https://www.financialresearch.gov/financial-stress-
index/files/indicators/index.html.  
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7. Conclusions 
 Previous research on technical analysis’ performance on equity markets is scarcely focused 
on certain features such as, study of a single, usually advanced, market index; a capped number 
and families of technical trading rules; no decomposition of their genuine profitable families; 
a non-realistic exercise of technical trading, which ignores transaction costs. In addition, other 
important questions, such as the length of the in-sample (IS)/out-of-sample (OOS) horizon for 
exercising technical analysis; the effect of financial stress on its performance; a detailed 
estimation of the persistence of technical analysis profitability; the importance of the frequency 
a portfolio of technical trading rules is rebalance, have rarely been answered or not answered 
at all. Hence, a comprehensive and up-to-date study of technical analysis on equity indices is 
more than urged from the academic community and the financial industry. 
In this study we exercise a large universe of 21,195 technical rules on twelve MSCI 
advanced, emerging and frontier indices covering a period from 2004 to 2015. Towards this 
direction, we examine the IS and OOS profitability, its persistence, the role of financial stress 
and whether there are rules that are profitable and significant in both IS and OOS horizons. We 
also explore the role of the size of the IS and the OOS on technical analysis performance. In 
addition, we introduce a novel multiple hypothesis testing approach for controlling data 
snooping bias and so helping us to make accurate statistical inferences across a significantly 
large universe of technical trading rules. Our DFRD+/- adopts a large-scale homogeneous 
discrete p-values framework, while dynamically performing the estimation of its parameters. 
It is a fully adaptive computationally and efficient approach for data snooping testing that can 
assist academics and investors dealing with large data sets and a high number of competing 
models. A Monte Carlo simulation proves its accuracy and demonstrates its superiority in terms 
of power relative to a strong FDR benchmark.  
The DFRD+/- approach identifies subsets of the technical rules that are genuine and profitable 
in the IS and the OOS. Among the families that outperform in all markets are mostly those of 
moving averages, channel breakouts and support and resistance, which belong to momentum 
classes of technical trading. Reversal strategies seem to have a weaker performance and 
significant presence only in specific markets (e.g., UK and Jordan). Additionally, the 
profitability and persistence of technical analysis vary in the OOS between the indices and the 
years, but we observe a peak for 2008 and 2009. In the following period, the profitability of 
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technical analysis diminishes, only to recover again in the most recent period. Concerning the 
persistence of technical analysis, it is higher on the US index. We note that all our results are 
negatively affected when the IS is decreased to one year or the OOS is increased to three or six 
months. For the same US market, we also observe that technical analysis gains value when 
financial stress levels are low, while we get the opposite picture for the emerging and other 
advanced markets. Finally, a novel cross-validation exercise confirms that a small number of 
technical rules are genuine and profitable in both the IS and the IS-OOS periods.  
Our results demonstrate that technical analysis still has value and can exploit short-term 
market inefficiencies even in advanced markets. Its profitability varies over the years and 
indices and seems to be a factor of several parameters. Our empirical exercise reveals two 
factors, the level of financial stress and the choice of the IS and OOS. Our result explains also 
to some extent the inconsistencies in the previous literature. Part of the previous research in the 
field tries to identify whether genuine technical rules exist for long periods (Brock et al., 1992; 
Hsu et al., 2010; Hsu et al. 2016). Our results demonstrate that the profitability of technical 
rules has short persistence. The fact that a technical rule is not profitable for extended periods 
does not mean that technical analysis has no value. Other research focuses only on individual 
indices and/or specific years for OOS testing (Brock et al., 1992; Sullivan et al., 1999; 
Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012). As discussed before, technical analysis profitability varies over 
the years and according to indices, a fact revealed with the assistance of our novel DFRD+/-, 
whose adaptiveness allowed us to conduct a large empirical analysis. Focusing on a specific 
index or year can lead to misleading results, as the effectiveness of technical rules appears to 
be highly volatile.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Monte Carlo simulations 
In this appendix, we present supporting evidence of the finite sample performance of the 
DFDR+/- test using a Monte Carlo experiment. Our main goal is the exploration of the empirical 
level and power of the test in accurately estimating the proportions of outperforming, 
underperforming and neutral trading rules. Even though we mainly focus on the FDR rate and 
its power on the rejection frequency of rules with significant returns (either positive or 
negative), we also compare it with the power of the FDR procedure presented in Storey (2004). 
Before we start running our Monte Carlo simulation, we need to ensure that our experiment 
correctly embodies the empirical properties of the technical trading strategies employed, such 
as their time series and cross-sectional dependencies (see also Barras et al., 2010; Hsu et al., 
2010; Bajgrowicz and Scaillet, 2012). We have previously demonstrated that our technical 
trading rules are fully characterized by a weak form of dependence, and this holds especially 
for those belonging in the same family (e.g. moving averages). This is the main property, and 
we need to take that into consideration when constructing our experiment. In this way, we can 
also examine whether our DFDR+/- does indeed have a good response to weak dependence 
conditions. In order to work in this direction we simultaneously resample matrices of 풷 × 푙 
returns, where 풷 the random block size is consecutive time series observations (풷u = 10) under 
the stationary bootstrap and  푙 = 21,195 denotes the trading rules universe as in the empirical 
exercise. This approach also allows us to preserve the cross-sectional dependencies among the 
strategies of the same class, while we also preserve autocorrelation every time we apply the 
same bootstrap replication to all trading rules. For the Monte Carlo experiment, we randomly 
select the original 155-day sample (i.e. seven months) from July 1, 2013 to February 1, 2014, 
to simulate our trajectories and we generate the 155-day trajectories for the 푙 = 21,195 trading 
rules as in the empirical exercise. In particular, we employ the stationary bootstrap to create 
every realized trajectory similar to calculating the p-values of the empirical study. We generate 
1,000 bootstrap replications of returns, where each replication has similar statistical properties.  
In order to obtain the true power of the DFDR+/- test in selecting the proportions of 
outperforming, underperforming and neutral rules, we need to control these proportions 
beforehand, likewise observing them a priori. We can then compare them with their 
corresponding estimations based on the DFDR+/-. We adjust 20% of the simulated strategies to 
outperform the benchmark, 50% to deliver “neutral” returns with no significant performance 
and 30% to underperform the benchmark during the simulation process. The selected 
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outperforming (underperforming) strategies consist only of a group of neighbouring rules, 
ranked in terms of highest (lowest) returns in our empirical sample. In this way we avoid having 
in our groups rules with only slightly different parameters but which at the same time possibly 
belong to both outperforming and underperforming classes. 
In terms of the specific procedure followed, we achieve the control of outperforming, 
“neutral” and underperforming rules by re-centring the generated returns of each trading rule 
with its own mean and we utilize that across all five families of rules. This actually leads to all 
trajectories having almost zero-mean properties while retaining their corresponding, unique 
standard deviations. We then shift the paths of the outperforming and underperforming rules by 
some positive and negative value respectively, while keeping each rule’s corresponding 
standard deviation the same. Such a parallel transition does not, however, affect the empirical 
properties of the paths, other than the mean (see Paparoditis and Politis, 2003). The notion is to 
construct the trajectories of different strategies in such a way as to exactly acquire the same, 
positive Sharpe ratio for all outperforming rules and the same negative Sharpe ratio for all 
underperforming rules. We specify both chosen positive and negative Sharpe ratios in 
advance23.  
As for the target Sharpe ratios employed for shifting the paths of outperforming and 
underperforming strategies, we follow the study of Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012) and select 
Sharpe ratios closely related to those obtained in our empirical exercise. In particular, we set 
three specific targets of positive Sharpe ratios for our outperforming rules, i.e., 2, 3, 4; and three 
specific targets of negative Sharpe ratios for our underperforming rules, i.e., -2, -3, -4. All of 
them correspond to annualized Sharpe ratios, just like those calculated from the daily returns 
of each strategy. We then consider pairs of the Sharpe ratios above in order to adjust the 
outperforming and underperforming rules, while shifting their trajectories towards the target. 
Take the (2, -2) pair for example. We design 20% of the rules to yield an equal Sharpe ratio of 
2 (i.e. outperforming) and likewise all 30% of the rules share an equal Sharpe ratio of -2 (i.e. 
underperforming). The remaining 50% of our rules’ universe show zero performance. This 
results in nine possible combinations of positive and negative Sharpe ratio pairs representing 
fixed alternative hypotheses against the null of a Sharpe ratio being equal to zero. The above 
levels seem to match our historical sample results since we obtain positive annualized Sharpe 
ratios up to 4 for the best-performing strategies and negative annualized Sharpe ratios down to 
                                                             
23 We multiply the corresponding standard deviation of each rule by the pre-specified Sharpe ratio and we add the 
calculated value to each data point so that the mean for the rule becomes SR sigma. 
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-4 for the worst-performing ones. However, the outperformance versus underperformance pair 
of (2, -2) still portrays quite a challenging set-up for our portfolio construction method.  
We present the results of our Monte Carlo experiments in Tables A.1-A.3 below. Table A.1 
displays the annualized mean excess return quartiles for the controlled outperforming and 
underperforming technical trading rules based on the 1,000 Monte Carlo replications for the 
nine combinations of Sharpe ratios examined. 
 
[Table A.1 here] 
 
In general, the annualized mean returns we obtain seem quite analogous to their 
corresponding Sharpe ratio levels, either positive or negative.  
Focusing on the estimation power of the DFDR+/- approach, Table A.2 presents the estimates 
for the proportions of outperforming (휋퐴Wv), underperformming (휋퐴&?) and neutral (휋N?) strategies 
under the Sharpe ratio metric and for the nine possible Sharpe ratio pairs. It also reports the 
success of the estimators in tracking the actual proportions of outperforming (휋퐴W = 20%), 
underperforming (휋퐴& = 30%), and neutral (휋N = 50%) trading rules. Once again, we apply 
the “point estimates method” of Storey et al. (2004) to the DFDR +/- test to obtain the estimators 
of these proportions based on the Monte Carlo results. This time we keep the cut-off threshold 
fixed to 훾∗ = 0.4, as at this point 휋퐴Wv  and 휋퐴&?   become constant (see Barras et al. 2010). In other 
words as 훾 increases up to an adequate enough value, 휋퐴Wv  and 휋퐴&?  include both genuine and false 
selections of trading rules representing the total number of outperforming and underperforming 
rules respectively. 
[Table A.2 here] 
 
Our DFDR+/- approach seems to provide quite robust estimators for the outperforming, 
underperforming and neutral proportions of technical trading rules, with only small deviations 
from their true corresponding levels. For instance, looking at the (3, -3) Sharpe ratios pair, the 
estimator for the outperforming rules (i.e. 휋퐴Wv), is 15.23%, the relevant estimator for 
underperforming rules (i.e. 휋퐴&?) is 27.68% and that for neutral rules (i.e. 휋N?) is 57.09%, which 
are quite close to their true levels of 20%, 30% and 50% respectively. This clearly highlights 
the power of our method in accurately identifying the true proportions of outperforming, 
underperforming and neutral rules in the entire population. 
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Finally, we present in Table A.3 the performance of constructed portfolios of outperforming 
rules under the DFDR+ approach based on the Monte Carlo simulation and for each of the nine 
Sharpe ratio combinations. We control the DFDR+ at a prespecified level similar to our 
empirical exercise. For instance, we build two different types of DFDR+ portfolios by setting 
the targets of erroneous selections at 10% and 20% respectively. In terms of performance and 
power, the table reports the actual false discovery rate achieved (FDR+) in comparison with its 
fixed level adjusted in advance (i.e. 10% and 20%), the proportions of genuinely best-
performing rules over the total number of outperforming rules denoted as “power”, and the 
absolute number of genuinely best-performing trading rules as “portfolio size”24. To reflect the 
marginal contribution of the proposed method, we compare our results with the FDR procedure 
of Storey et al. (2004), while controlling the FDR at the target levels of 10% and 20% 
respectively. 
[Table A.3 here] 
 
The findings of Table A.3 reveal that the DFDR+/- approach is superior in terms of finite 
sample power to the more conservative FDR approaches such as the one in Storey et al. (2004). 
Specifically, the DFDR+/- reports robust power in rules selection and portfolio size, while it 
closely tracks the actual false discovery rate across all conditions and Sharpe ratio pairs. For 
example, consider again the (3, -3) Sharpe ratios pair, where the 10%-DFDR+ portfolio 
efficiently converges to its FDR rate at 8% and successfully discovers on average 64.74% of 
the best-performing rules. On the other hand, the corresponding 10%-FDR portfolio discovers 
only 30.27% of the best-performing rules on average, while it meets its target rate only at 7.3%. 
When it comes to the size of portfolios, the 10%-DFDR+ outstandingly outperforms the 10%-
FDR approach by sufficiently selecting 3,048 rules, while the benchmark method detects only 
1907. Increasing the target rate of the FDR to 20% does not affect the patterns since it improves 
the power of selection to 39.86% while the portfolio size is not affected (1,907). The 20%-
DFDR+ though, performs even better by detecting on average 66.3% of the outperforming rules, 
and forms a portfolio of 3,322 trading rules. In terms of target rate, the 20%-DFDR+ portfolio 
falls below 20% and achieves an FDR+ of 10.59%. Asymptotic theory is the most possible 
reason for this outcome, but the 20%-DFDR+ portfolio is still able to successfully deal with data 
                                                             
24 We compute the actual false discovery rate (FDR+) by replacing the actual proportion of neutral trading rules 
(i.e.  instead of the estimated one (i.e., ) in  . 
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snooping bias as seen above. Overall, our Monte Carlo experiments undoubtedly reveal that the 
DFDR+/- method has greater power when compared with conservative FDR methods, such as 
the Storey et al. (2004) procedure. 
 
Appendix B. IS Performance, Disaggregation Analysis and Robustness Exercise 
We repeat all the exercises by setting the look-back period to one year and the OOS to 3, 6 
and 9 months respectively this time. Figure B.1 and tables B.1 to B.5 report all relevant results 
for IS performance, break-even transaction costs and OOS performance.  
Tables B.6 to B.10 present the exact contribution, in percentage terms, of every class of rules 
to the overall universe of survivors every year, as those have been presented on average in Table 
4 in section 5.1. 
 
B.1. IS Performance 
As about IS performance, Table B.2 presents the annualized returns and Sharpe ratios of 
significant rules after one-way transaction costs during a look-back period of one year, similar 
to Table 3 in the IS performance section.  
 
[Table B.2 here] 
 
Comparing the corresponding Tables 3 and B.2, we conclude that when using one year as 
our look-back period, the performance of trading rules is somewhat better in terms both of 
excess mean return and Sharpe ratio criteria. Of course, this was somehow anticipated since the 
bigger the sample period, the more the technical trading rules are exposed to fluctuations and 
market risks in general, leading to lower performance most of the time. Realizing higher IS 
returns in smaller sample horizons is a common phenomenon not only for the relevant literature 
but also for trading desks. 
 
B.2 Disaggregation Analysis 
We perform a disaggregation analysis for the five families of technical trading rules 
separately and we present the percentage profitability of every single family among the DFDR+/- 
procedure survivors in Tables B.3-B.7. 
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[Table B.3 here] 
[Table B.4 here] 
[Table B.5 here] 
[Table B.6 here] 
[Table B.7 here] 
 
The RSI and support and resistance rules seem to perform better in recent periods (i.e., 2012-
2015), reporting a contribution in the portfolios of significant rules, while only few of them 
survive over the earlier periods. Additionally, the filter rules’ performance varies over the years, 
with 2009 and 2010 being the best years in terms of profitability. The same finding seems to 
hold for channel breakout rules, however they seem to contribute more to the overall portfolio 
performance up to 2010. Finally, moving averages retain the biggest proportion in the 
portfolios’ profitability over the years, with the first half of the examined period (i.e., 2006-
2011) being their best in terms of performance. 
 
B.3 Break-even Transaction Costs 
In terms of break-even transaction costs, Figure B.1 demonstrates the corresponding size of 
average break-even transaction costs per year for the best-performing technical trading rule 
selected on a monthly OOS basis and for each index separately. However, this time the IS period 
covers one year.  
 [Figure B.1 here] 
 
Once again frontier and emerging markets (i.e. Brazil, Morocco, Russia) report the highest 
break-even transaction costs over the first four years in general. In addition, the UK surprisingly 
achieves one of the highest break-even costs in 2009. When it comes to the rest of the years, 
until the very recent periods there is a considerable decay of these costs, similar to Figure 1, in 
which a two-year IS is employed. However, this is not always the case for all markets examined. 
For example, for some emerging and frontier countries, such as Russia and Estonia, the break-
even transaction costs seem to recover in 2015 and 2013 respectively. Overall, the break-even 
transaction costs as well as their evident cyclicality are not that high here compared to those 
under the two-year IS as presented in Figure 1. 
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B.4 OOS Performance 
However, what matters most for a technical trader is the OOS simulation findings rather than 
the IS ones. Tables B.8-B.10 correspond to a one-year look-back period as IS while considering 
the OOS periods of one, three and six months respectively.  
 
[Table B.8 here] 
[Table B.9 here] 
[Table B.10 here] 
 
In this case, we observe opposing evidence with regards to the IS period chosen each time. 
For example, comparing Tables 4 – 6 corresponding to the IS period of two years and the same 
OOS periods with Tables B.8 – B.10, the results provided by the first approach are more 
favourable. We may attribute these findings to the fact that including more information (a larger 
historical sample) when searching for a predictive technical trading rule IS, results in a better 
performance OOS. Moreover, we can also explain the above findings in terms of technical 
trading rules’ specific characteristics and parameterizations. For instance, we utilize technical 
trading rules, even of the same family, whose lagged values span from one day up to one year 
(e.g. a double moving average of two and five days respectively; a double moving average of 
150 and 250 days respectively). This means that they both need different time periods in order 
to capture all the available market trends, momentum or reversals. Choosing a small IS period 
(i.e. one year) might provide enough information for trading rules utilizing short periods of 
previous market returns (i.e. a double moving average of two and five days) but not enough 
inputs for trading rules looking back at longer periods of market movements (i.e. a double 
moving average of 150 and 250 days respectively). Hence, in our opinion considering a 
sufficient enough horizon based on a strategy’s properties, while setting an optimal IS/OOS 
ratio, is equally important for the selection of the best predictive rule. 
We investigate further the above optimality in the IS and OOS ratio with respect to sample 
periods chosen by looking at the corresponding performances of the significant technical 
trading rules over the three different OOS periods (i.e. one, three and six months) examined and 
the IS period of one year in this appendix. In terms of average annual performance of all markets 
considered (i.e. last row), Tables B.8 – B.10 reveal specific patterns in OOS excess profitability 
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of technical trading rules according to both mean return and Sharpe ratio metrics. Specifically, 
from 2006 to 2009 employing the short OOS period of one month achieves higher mean returns 
as well as Sharpe ratios compared to the longer periods used (i.e. three and six months), which 
display a decay as the OOS periods becomes larger during these years. On the contrary, there 
is a turning point in this phenomenon for the period 2010-2012. The longer the OOS period, 
the greater the mean return and Sharpe ratio. Despite that, we must note that both metrics appear 
negative during these years. For the rest of the years (i.e. 2013-2015), technical trading rules 
seem to perform better using the OOS period of one month, even yielding positive metrics in 
2015. In general, profitability diminishes as we approach the most recent periods for all OOS 
periods and across all markets considered. This evidence is consistent with the general findings 
presented in Section 6.1 when a two-year IS horizon was considered. 
When it comes to each market’s average performance over the full ten-year period (i.e. last 
column) the picture is quite different. There is no clear evidence in support of a specific OOS 
period in general and sometimes both performance metrics employed provide contradictory 
results. We conclude that the most suitable OOS horizon depends on the specific market 
exploited. For advanced markets, the performance of trading rules seems to improve according 
to the Sharpe ratio as we expand the OOS period, but this is not the case when the mean excess 
return is adopted as the performance criterion. As for the emerging and frontier markets, results 
provide the opposite result, in which the shorter the OOS periods employed, the better the 
technical trading rules performance, which is consistent with both mean return and Sharpe ratio. 
Despite that, we must also mention that technical trading rules underperform the benchmark 
most of the time, especially in the advanced markets, which once again justifies the use of an 
IS period of two years. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Break-even cost for the top performing survivor of the DFDR + procedure (IS 2 Years) 
The values are in percentages and calculated as the transaction cost that sets the excess return to zero over 
the period under study. The IS period is set at two years, while the same results for IS of one year is available 
in Figure A.1. The values are calculated by repeating the procedure at the start of each month and averaging 
over 12 months.  
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Figure B.1. Break-even cost for the top performing survivor of the DFDR+ procedure (IS 1 Year) 
The values are in percentages and calculated as the transaction cost that sets the excess return to zero over the 
period under study. The IS period is set at one year. The values are calculated by repeating the procedure at the 
start of each month and averaging over 12 months. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Summary statistics of the daily return series under study (12 MSCI indices and the federal funds rate).  
Market Mean (bp) Max (%) Min (%) Std. dev. (%) Kurtosis Skewness First AC (significance) 
Advanced 1.55 9.10 -7.33 1.02 12.86 -0.50 0.12 (*) 
US 1.45 11.04 -9.51 1.18 15.11 -0.36 -0.10 (*) 
UK 1.60 17.32 -36.26 1.29 212.22 -6.62 0.01 
Japan 2.66 12.77 -20.75 1.27 62.62 -2.12 -0.07 
Emerging 1.91 10.07 -9.99 1.27 11.38 -0.49 0.22 (*) 
Russia 1.83 42.37 -58.10 2.35 172.93 -2.26 0.02 
China 3.32 14.05 -12.84 1.74 10.10 -0.04 0.03 (*) 
Brazil 3.59 37.69 -46.23 2.19 109.54 -0.39 0.02 
Frontier 1.95 12.54 -9.32 1.62 8.74 0.20 0.06 (*) 
Estonia 2.96 5.50 -7.70 1.06 6.47 -0.13 0.16 (*) 
Morocco 0.99 5.69 -9.07 0.83 15.56 -1.38 0.26 (*) 
Jordan 1.21 7.82 -9.08 1.10 13.03 -0.71 0.07 (*) 
Federal funds rate 0.53 0.02 0.00 0.01 2.78 1.18 1.00 (*) 
The mean daily returns are reported in basis points (bp). Maximum, minimum and standard deviation are presented in percentages (%). The last column reports the first-order 
autocorrelation coefficients. Coefficients notated with (*) are significant at 1% (*) level for the Ljung-Box Q statistic. The study period for all time series is 01/01/2004 to 
31/12/2016. 
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Table 2  
Percentage and standard deviation of the DFDR+/- procedure survivors (IS 2 years).  
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 0.34  (0.97) 
1.16  
(1.87) 
0.43  
(1.03) 
2.39  
(1.78) 
2.84  
(1.56) 
3.52  
(7.03) 
0.24  
(0.06) 
3.50  
(7.02) 
16.24 
 (11.37) 
0.33  
(0.15) 
3.10  
(3.28) 
US 0.01  (0.00) 
0.02  
(0.01) 
0.16  
(0.32) 
0.91  
(1.12) 
1.54  
(0.94) 
8.33  
(9.49) 
0.28  
(0.07) 
7.75  
(10.55) 
31.49  
(3.55) 
19.58  
(13.81) 
7.01  
(3.99) 
UK 20.08  (9.08) 
15.52  
(10.26) 
0.32  
(0.38) 
12.97  
(10.21) 
20.89  
(6.96) 
9.41  
(9.88) 
0.18  
(0.04) 
0.15  
(0.06) 
8.72  
(11.71) 
0.29 
 (0.09) 
8.85  
(5.87) 
Japan 3.59  (6.56) 
0.11  
(0.04) 
0.69  
(1.49) 
3.20  
(1.32) 
2.58  
(0.29) 
1.09  
(1.40) 
0.29  
(0.05) 
0.27  
(0.07) 
0.18  
(0.03) 
0.16  
(0.04) 
1.22  
(1.13) 
Emerging 2.87  (5.39) 
1.26  
(1.19) 
1.12  
(1.46) 
3.35  
(0.97) 
6.04  
(4.46) 
9.01  
(10.21) 
0.36  
(0.09) 
0.39  
(0.10) 
0.19  
(0.08) 
0.24  
(0.12) 
2.48  
(2.41) 
Russia 14.39  (7.39) 
16.22  
(9.55) 
1.77  
(3.48) 
25.64  
(7.84) 
17.61  
(4.78) 
10.90  
(10.65) 
0.28  
(0.10) 
0.44  
(0.11) 
0.58  
(0.14) 
0.90  
(0.30) 
8.87  
(4.43) 
China 2.59  (3.38) 
32.32  
(15.03) 
5.14  
(9.68) 
0.93  
(0.56) 
3.72  
(6.77) 
3.59  
(7.16) 
0.28  
(0.01) 
0.27  
(0.07) 
0.20  
(0.09) 
0.81 
 (0.52) 
4.99  
(4.33) 
Brazil 22.52  (13.6) 
8.62  
(7.28) 
8.84  
(8.44) 
17.79 
 (5.10) 
20.84  
(5.19) 
8.71  
(9.74) 
0.09  
(0.07) 
0.27  
(0.35) 
1.02  
(0.38) 
0.32 
 (0.14) 
8.9  
(5.03) 
Frontier 14.14  (12.40) 
1.10  
(0.45) 
3.85 
 (7.50) 
29.22  
(7.27) 
25.26  
(9.00) 
7.24  
(9.64) 
0.37  
(0.19) 
0.47  
(0.23) 
4.39  
(7.36) 
1.49  
(1.26) 
8.75  
(5.53) 
Estonia 17.37  (16.94) 
0.35  
(0.71) 
4.34  
(7.12) 
7.91  
(2.73) 
7.52  
(4.13) 
10.23 
(10.14) 
0.19  
(0.05) 
4.35  
(7.18) 
8.86  
(6.51) 
0.66  
(1.26) 
6.18  
(5.68) 
Morocco 7.36  (8.27) 
26.96  
(8.76) 
17.24  
(9.58) 
4.82  
(2.90) 
0.64  
(0.63) 
0.15  
(0.06) 
0.34  
(0.34) 
0.65  
(0.62) 
0.15  
(0.05) 
0.22  
(0.10) 
5.85  
(3.13) 
Jordan 20.26  (11.4) 
1.57  
(2.22) 
1.77  
(1.67) 
4.27  
(1.34) 
1.52  
(0.62) 
0.67  
(0.84) 
0.21  
(0.05) 
0.09  
(0.03) 
0.11  
(0.03) 
0.18  
(0.07) 
3.06  
(1.83) 
Average 10.46  (7.95) 
8.77  
(4.78) 
3.81  
(4.35) 
9.45  
(3.60) 
9.25  
(3.78) 
6.07  
(7.19) 
0.26  
(0.09) 
1.55  
(2.20) 
6.01  
(3.44) 
2.10  
(1.49) 
5.77  
(3.89) 
This table reports the percentage and standard deviations of the survivor rules adjusted by the total number of rules. For example, in 2006 for the advanced market, the average 
number of surviving rules is 72 (0.0034*21195) and their standard deviation is 206 (0.0097*21195). The average is estimated from the twelve portfolios whose OOS is in 2006. 
The first portfolio’s IS runs from 01/01/2004-31/12/2005 and the remaining eleven are calculated by rolling forward the IS by one month.  
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Table 3 
Annualized Returns and Sharpe Ratios after Transaction Costs (IS 2 Years) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 10.67% (1.62) 
11.87% 
(1.44) 
14.93% 
(1.39) 
27.00% 
(1.66) 
24.73% 
(1.62) 
8.65% 
(1.79) 
8.06% 
(1.75) 
7.92% 
(1.65) 
9.36% 
(1.57) 
5.64% 
(2.39) 
12.88% 
(1.69) 
US 8.65% (0.95) 
10.41% 
(1.11) 
14.36% 
(1.11) 
25.44% 
(1.19) 
24.93% 
(1.20) 
9.54% 
(1.38) 
8.45% 
(1.50) 
10.73% 
(1.51) 
10.55% 
(1.48) 
7.50% 
(1.24) 
13.05% 
(1.27) 
UK 10.13% (1.21) 
11.00% 
(1.21) 
15.50% 
(0.90) 
23.53% 
(0.99) 
28.08% 
(1.16) 
11.32% 
(1.25) 
4.89% 
(2.19) 
5.48% 
(1.33) 
11.53% 
(1.52) 
8.02% 
(1.99) 
12.95% 
(1.38) 
Japan 14.23% (1.02) 
13.37% 
(0.98) 
9.13% 
(0.73) 
19.31% 
(1.10) 
18.57% 
(1.18) 
7.24% 
(1.17) 
7.05% 
(1.38) 
5.73% 
(1.64) 
3.70% 
(1.64) 
3.14% 
(1.83) 
10.15% 
(1.27) 
Emerging 19.92% (2.35) 
22.49% 
(2.09) 
26.91% 
(1.84) 
37.28% 
(2.04) 
34.96% 
(1.98) 
12.36% 
(1.88) 
12.61% 
(2.08) 
12.86% 
(2.09) 
8.83% 
(2.11) 
6.25% 
(1.89) 
19.45% 
(2.03) 
Russia 22.47% (0.95) 
22.45% 
(0.98) 
16.30% 
(0.70) 
46.59% 
(1.18) 
47.53% 
(1.30) 
15.61% 
(1.15) 
14.90% 
(1.74) 
17.32% 
(1.75) 
11.51% 
(1.76) 
22.86% 
(1.65) 
23.76% 
(1.32) 
China 23.05% (1.65) 
24.14% 
(1.73) 
35.52% 
(1.68) 
43.71% 
(1.52) 
32.85% 
(1.37) 
8.73% 
(1.37) 
5.51% 
(2.33) 
8.40% 
(1.90) 
12.01% 
(1.75) 
14.51% 
(1.65) 
20.84% 
(1.70) 
Brazil 24.90% (1.35) 
27.61% 
(1.06) 
30.54% 
(1.02) 
37.87% 
(1.25) 
35.75% 
(1.22) 
11.15% 
(1.17) 
11.41% 
(1.98) 
15.05% 
(1.83) 
13.20% 
(1.85) 
17.85% 
(1.48) 
22.53% 
(1.42) 
Frontier 16.79% (2.60) 
17.46% 
(2.33) 
20.21% 
(1.95) 
29.42% 
(2.06) 
28.96% 
(2.24) 
12.98% 
(2.39) 
10.32% 
(2.17) 
10.23% 
(2.24) 
9.39% 
(2.27) 
10.49% 
(2.02) 
16.62% 
(2.23) 
Estonia 18.07% (1.81) 
20.66% 
(1.64) 
29.00% 
(1.77) 
42.44% 
(1.73) 
40.75% 
(1.78) 
18.93% 
(1.47) 
13.62% 
(1.77) 
12.09% 
(1.58) 
13.37% 
(1.38) 
10.94% 
(1.37) 
21.99% 
(1.63) 
Morocco 21.44% (2.07) 
21.55% 
(1.91) 
24.35% 
(1.71) 
27.58% 
(1.60) 
16.92% 
(1.54) 
4.60% 
(1.99) 
10.91% 
(1.17) 
12.83% 
(1.21) 
4.86% 
(1.95) 
3.47% 
(1.34) 
14.85% 
(1.65) 
Jordan 33.77% (1.97) 
25.68% 
(1.56) 
21.99% 
(1.59) 
28.3% 
(1.59) 
22.09% 
(1.43) 
12.05% 
(1.79) 
9.5% 
(1.83) 
4.60% 
(1.91) 
6.92% 
(1.52) 
5.79% 
(1.55) 
17.07% 
(1.67) 
Average 18.67% (1.63) 
19.06% 
(1.50) 
21.56% 
(1.37) 
32.37% 
(1.49) 
29.68% 
(1.50) 
11.10% 
(1.57) 
9.77% 
(1.82) 
10.27% 
(1.72) 
9.60% 
(1.73) 
9.70% 
(1.70) 
17.18% 
(1.60) 
This table reports the average IS annualized returns and Sharpe ratios of twelve portfolios for two years of IS after transaction costs (rolling forward by one month). For 
example, the 10.67% annualized return of the advanced markets (2006) is calculated as the average IS annualized return of twelve portfolios. The first portfolio’s IS return is 
calculated over the period of 01/01/2004-31/12/2005. The remaining eleven are calculated by rolling forward the IS by one month. The same logic applies for the Sharpe ratios. 
The last column and row present the average performance per market across all years and per year respectively.  
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Table 4 
Percentage decomposition of the DFDR+/- procedure survivors in classes of technical trading rules (IS 2 Years) 
Market Average of RSI% 
Average of 
FR% 
Average of 
MA% 
Average of 
SR% 
Average of 
CB% 
Advanced 4.97% 8.54% 65.78% 7.30% 13.40% 
US 0.85% 10.84% 61.46% 10.07% 16.78% 
UK 10.09% 11.32% 60.81% 5.79% 12.00% 
Japan 8.31% 8.93% 39.10% 22.42% 21.25% 
Emerging 6.07% 21.97% 42.98% 13.98% 15.00% 
Russia 3.57% 18.28% 48.54% 19.32% 10.29% 
China 3.69% 8.71% 63.61% 16.77% 7.22% 
Brazil 7.09% 10.96% 56.41% 13.31% 12.23% 
Frontier 3.19% 16.79% 52.88% 14.23% 12.90% 
Estonia 1.27% 7.65% 69.34% 12.77% 8.96% 
Morocco 9.81% 6.12% 59.34% 18.38% 6.35% 
Jordan 16.93% 9.26% 54.13% 14.15% 5.54% 
Grand Total 6.32% 11.61% 56.20% 14.04% 11.83% 
This table reports the decomposition (in percentage terms) of the DFDR+/- procedure survivors in every single family of technical 
trading rules as an average across all years examined. For example, for the advanced market, 4.97% of the survivors belongs to RSI 
rules, 8.54% to filter rules, 65.78% to moving averages, 7.3% to support and resistance and 13.4% to channel breakouts on average 
for the period 2006-2015. For every year, the IS portfolio runs for two years and the remaining eleven are calculated by rolling forward 
the IS by one month.  
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Table 5 
Annualized Returns and Sharpe Ratios after Transaction Costs (IS 2 Years and OOS 1 Month) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced -3.66%  (-0.54) 
-4.72%  
(-0.43) 
10.63%  
(0.41) 
4.14%  
(0.25) 
-17.79%  
(-2.91) 
-1.92%  
(-0.5) 
-3.23%  
(-1.27) 
0.35%  
(0.13) 
-2.07%  
(-0.42) 
-1.43% 
(-0.64) 
-1.97%  
(-0.59) 
US 1.81%  (0.2) 
-6.16%  
(-0.45) 
22.72%  
(0.77) 
-3.64%  
(-0.19) 
-14.07%  
(-1.49) 
-1.65%  
(-0.31) 
-1.37%  
(-0.5) 
7.02%  
(1.31) 
5.73%  
(0.77) 
-5.28%  
(-0.71) 
0.51%  
(-0.06) 
UK 15.94%  (1.55) 
-3.14%  
(-0.27) 
16.5%  
(0.41) 
19.58%  
(1.16) 
-12.73%  
(-1.47) 
-4.12%  
(-0.58) 
-3.83%  
(-3.7) 
1.67%  
(0.67) 
-7.09%  
(-0.97) 
-2.8%  
(-0.45) 
2% 
(-0.36) 
Japan -11.33%  (-0.76) 
-8.68%  
(-1.8) 
41.53%  
(1.4) 
11.47%  
(0.51) 
-2.11%  
(-0.37) 
-7.87%  
(-1.62) 
-3.3%  
(-1.31) 
-3.95%  
(-1.03) 
-5.75%  
(-2.27) 
-2.98%  
(-1.13) 
0.7%  
(-0.84) 
Emerging 1.75%  (0.15) 
-1.93%  
(-0.15) 
43.52%  
(1.1) 
4.25%  
(0.29) 
-7.22%  
(-1.09) 
-3.14%  
(-0.52) 
-0.93%  
(-0.23) 
-1.71% 
(-0.55) 
-3.71%  
(-1.28) 
-1.16%  
(-0.31) 
2.97% 
 (-0.26) 
Russia 45.77%  (1.25) 
-9%  
(-1.33) 
45.64%  
(1.01) 
13.09%  
(0.47) 
-20.64%  
(-2.1) 
-9.9%  
(-1.02) 
-2.42%  
(-0.44) 
-4.63%  
(-0.92) 
6.92%  
(0.44) 
-12.48%  
(-0.98) 
5.24%  
(-0.36) 
China 59.59%  (2.62) 
29.16%  
(1.17) 
-2.1%  
(-0.05) 
-19.48%  
(-1.04) 
-8.93%  
(-1.09) 
-10.76%  
(-1.4) 
-0.29%  
(-0.64) 
-3.54%  
(-1.42) 
-4.51%  
(-0.66) 
11.46%  
(0.82) 
5.06%  
(-0.17) 
Brazil 7.53%  (0.28) 
67.85%  
(1.2) 
48.86%  
(0.9) 
15.4%  
(0.68) 
-15.81%  
(-1.67) 
-5.12%  
(-0.73) 
-7.98%  
(-2.42) 
-3.03%  
(-0.49) 
-7.35%  
(-0.6) 
-1.07% 
 (-0.07) 
9.93%  
(-0.29) 
Frontier -11.64%  (-2.04) 
14.24%  
(1.44) 
64.67%  
(2.24) 
11.12%  
(1.04) 
0.26% 
(0.06) 
-12.4%  
(-3.55) 
-0.27%  
(-0.09) 
4.2%  
(0.98) 
7.75%  
(1.39) 
2.33% 
(0.32) 
8.03%  
(0.18) 
Estonia -4.93%  (-0.62) 
-7.76%  
(-0.45) 
65.08%  
(1.46) 
2.83%  
(0.1) 
6.06%  
(0.3) 
-24.12%  
(-2.6) 
6.26%  
(0.98) 
-4.29%  
(-0.69) 
12.92%  
(1.23) 
-13.23%  
(-2.11) 
3.88%  
(-0.24) 
Morocco 34%  (1.87) 
21.97%  
(1.65) 
25.32%  
(1.2) 
1.5%  
(0.1) 
-10.22% 
(-2.17) 
-2.49%  
(-0.87) 
1.19%  
(0.1) 
-4.9%  
(-0.48) 
-0.64%  
(-0.61) 
-0.36%  
(-0.17) 
6.54%  
(0.06) 
Jordan -0.62%  (-0.04) 
-3.47%  
(-0.43) 
37.89%  
(1.32) 
-9.46%  
(-0.81) 
-0.12%  
(-0.02) 
-0.79%  
(-0.13) 
-4.59%  
(-1.55) 
-2.27%  
(-1.03) 
-4.63% 
(-1.23) 
-1.32%  
(-0.37) 
1.06%  
(-0.43) 
Average 11.18%  (0.33) 
7.36% 
(0.01) 
35.02%  
(1.02) 
4.23%  
(0.21) 
-8.61%  
(-1.17) 
-7.02%  
(-1.15) 
-1.73%  
(-0.92) 
-1.26%  
(-0.29) 
-0.2%  
(-0.35) 
-2.36%  
(-0.48) 
3.66%  
(-0.28) 
This table reports the average OOS annualized returns and Sharpe ratios of twelve portfolios for two years of IS and one month of OOS after transaction costs (rolling forward 
by one month). For example, the -3.66% annualized return of the advanced markets (2006) is calculated as the average OOS annualized return of twelve portfolios. The first 
portfolio’s OOS return is calculated over January 2006 using as IS the period 01/01//2004-31/12/2005. The remaining eleven OOS returns are calculated by rolling forward the 
IS by one month. The same logic applies for the Sharpe ratios. The last column and row present the average performance per market across all years and per year respectively.   
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Table 6 
Annualized Returns and Sharpe Ratios after Transaction Costs (IS 2 Years and OOS 3 Months) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced -4.54%  (-0.62) 
-3.26%  
(-0.27) 
24.85%  
(0.99) 
-5.42%  
(-0.4) 
-13.37%  
(-2.23) 
-2.42%  
(-0.53) 
-2.91%  
(-1.22) 
-1.35%  
(-0.46) 
0.20% 
 (0.04) 
-2.24%  
(-1.06) 
-1.05%  
(-0.57) 
US 4.28%  (0.48) 
-4.93%  
(-0.36) 
34.43%  
(1.12) 
-14.00%  
(-0.89) 
-9.63%  
(-1.10) 
-5.86%  
(-0.86) 
-0.98%  
(-0.41) 
5.41%  
(1.03) 
6.43% 
 (0.86) 
-4.84%  
(-0.68) 
1.03%  
(-0.08) 
UK 14.9%  (1.48) 
-13.25%  
(-0.88) 
35.36%  
(0.79) 
9.70%  
(0.67) 
-9.29%  
(-1.03) 
-5.68%  
(-0.8) 
-2.07%  
(-2.10) 
0.82%  
(0.31) 
-5.53% 
 (-0.81) 
-2.75%  
(-0.46) 
2.22%  
(-0.28) 
Japan -16.79%  (-0.96) 
-9.00%  
(-1.81) 
29.70%  
(1.03) 
4.98%  
(0.23) 
-1.76%  
(-0.35) 
-5.78%  
(-1.53) 
-3.03%  
(-1.25) 
-2.77%  
(-0.86) 
-2.84% 
 (-1.70) 
-3.67%  
(-1.49) 
-1.10%  
(-0.87) 
Emerging -4.31%  (-0.42) 
-2.01%  
(-0.15) 
15.33%  
(0.49) 
-1.19%  
(-0.10) 
-5.19%  
(-0.79) 
-0.19%  
(-0.03) 
-1.92%  
(-0.52) 
-0.38%  
(-0.11) 
-4.35%  
(-1.74) 
-1.54%  
(-0.4) 
-0.57%  
(-0.38) 
Russia 37.24%  (1.11) 
-6.90%  
(-0.54) 
31.94%  
(0.95) 
3.01%  
(0.13) 
-17.55%  
(-1.79) 
-7.51%  
(-0.82) 
-0.09%  
(-0.02) 
-5.58%  
(-1.08) 
0.52% 
 (0.04) 
-12.47%  
(-1.08) 
2.26%  
(-0.31) 
China 35.48%  (1.70) 
29.13% 
 (1.20) 
3.30%  
(0.09) 
-8.37%  
(-0.51) 
-6.97%  
(-0.89) 
-4.61%  
(-0.71) 
-0.42%  
(-0.87) 
-3.18%  
(-1.24) 
-6.54%  
(-1.04) 
3.89%  
(0.32) 
4.17%  
(-0.19) 
Brazil 1.52%  (0.06) 
50.70%  
(1.05) 
7.94%  
(0.18) 
11.17%  
(0.52) 
-14.63%  
(-1.55) 
-3.96%  
(-0.59) 
-5.03%  
(-1.62) 
-5.62%  
(-0.91) 
-7.23%  
(-0.65) 
-2.33%  
(-0.18) 
3.25%  
(-0.37) 
Frontier -11.37%  (-2.03) 
9.60%  
(1.01) 
75.78%  
(2.65) 
-2.44%  
(-0.31) 
2.13%  
(0.50) 
-6.28%  
(-1.67) 
0.37%  
(0.13) 
1.03%  
(0.26) 
1.24%  
(0.25) 
4.47%  
(0.60) 
7.45%  
(0.14) 
Estonia -1.93%  (-0.18) 
-11.44%  
(-0.79) 
55.63%  
(1.37) 
11.29%  
(0.40) 
-3.33%  
(-0.20) 
-17.59%  
(-1.95) 
0.50%  
(0.09) 
-4.46%  
(-0.83) 
5.34% 
 (0.53) 
-8.70%  
(-1.61) 
2.53% 
 (-0.32) 
Morocco 17.57%  (1.12) 
24.57%  
(1.92) 
9.62%  
(0.55) 
-7.56%  
(-0.63) 
-8.20%  
(-1.83) 
-2.49%  
(-0.87) 
-1.49%  
(-0.15) 
-6.25%  
(-0.62) 
-0.98% 
 (-0.83) 
-2.83%  
(-1.49) 
2.19%  
(-0.28) 
Jordan -2.77%  (-0.20) 
-1.36%  
(-0.16) 
32.59%  
(1.22) 
-12.14%  
(-1.12) 
-0.37%  
(-0.05) 
-0.28%  
(-0.05) 
-4.27%  
(-1.46) 
-2.94%  
(-1.19) 
-2.37% 
 (-0.65) 
-0.49%  
(-0.14) 
0.56%  
(-0.38) 
Average 5.77%  (0.13) 
5.15%  
(0.02) 
29.71%  
(0.95) 
-0.91%  
(-0.17) 
-7.35%  
(-0.94) 
-5.22%  
(-0.87) 
-1.78%  
(-0.78) 
-2.11%  
(-0.47) 
-1.34%  
(-0.48) 
-2.79%  
(-0.64) 
1.91% 
 (-0.33) 
This table reports the average OOS annualized returns and Sharpe ratios of four portfolios for IS of two years and OOS of three months after transaction costs (rolling forward 
by one month). For example, the -4.54% annualized return of the advanced markets (2006) is calculated as the average OOS annualized return of twelve portfolios. The first 
portfolio’s OOS return is calculated over the period 01/01/2006-31/03/2006 using as IS the period 01/01//2004-31/12/2005. The remaining eleven OOS returns are calculated 
by rolling forward the IS and the OOS by one month. The same logic applies for the Sharpe ratios. The last column and row present the average performance per market across 
all years and per year respectively. 
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Table 7 
Annualized Returns and Sharpe Ratios after Transaction Costs (IS 2 Years and OOS 6 Months) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 1.05%  (0.14) 
-1.88%  
(-0.15) 
13.92%  
(0.57) 
-2.48%  
(-0.22) 
-9.35%  
(-1.49) 
-5.75%  
(-1.16) 
-2.58%  
(-1.14) 
0.74%  
(0.26) 
-0.82% 
 (-0.17) 
-0.75%  
(-0.32) 
-0.79%  
(-0.37) 
US 0.53%  (0.06) 
-6.82%  
(-0.46) 
26.57%  
(0.90) 
-7.22%  
(-0.53) 
-6.95%  
(-0.82) 
-5.85%  
(-0.72) 
0.63%  
(0.25) 
4.77%  
(0.95) 
5.66% 
 (0.75) 
-6.46%  
(-0.95) 
0.49%  
(-0.06) 
UK 15.09%  (1.45) 
-12.07%  
(-0.91) 
42.99%  
(0.98) 
1.97%  
(0.16) 
-8.36%  
(-0.92) 
-7.78%  
(-0.93) 
-1.18%  
(-1.27) 
0.68%  
(0.29) 
-7.72% 
 (-1.20) 
-2.01%  
(-0.32) 
2.16%  
(-0.27) 
Japan -18.42%  (-1.02) 
-9.13%  
(-1.59) 
35.99%  
(1.11) 
0.61%  
(0.04) 
-2.46%  
(-0.51) 
-3.60%  
(-1.18) 
-2.15%  
(-0.83) 
-2.42%  
(-0.88) 
-1.25% 
 (-0.86) 
-3.34%  
(-1.29) 
-0.62%  
(-0.70) 
Emerging -1.43%  (-0.15) 
4.61%  
(0.34) 
18.10%  
(0.57) 
0.35%  
(0.03) 
-2.69%  
(-0.41) 
-4.97%  
(-0.78) 
0.87%  
(0.21) 
-0.65%  
(-0.18) 
-2.32% 
 (-0.88) 
-1.87%  
(-0.45) 
1.00% 
 (-0.17) 
Russia 17.28%  (0.68) 
-2.67%  
(-0.20) 
34.27%  
(0.94) 
-4.48%  
(-0.22) 
-15.42%  
(-1.54) 
-11.21% 
 (-1.05) 
-1.32%  
(-0.28) 
-10.12%  
(-1.83) 
0.31% 
 (0.02) 
-5.83%  
(-0.48) 
0.08%  
(-0.39) 
China 25.95%  (1.35) 
25.27%  
(1.01) 
0.34%  
(0.01) 
-5.22%  
(-0.33) 
-3.90%  
(-0.48) 
-5.51% 
 (-0.76) 
-0.45%  
(-0.91) 
-4.18%  
(-1.71) 
-5.06%  
(-0.78) 
0.65% 
 (0.06) 
2.79%  
(-0.25) 
Brazil -5.00%  (-0.22) 
42.45%  
(0.99) 
-24.49%  
(-0.66) 
11.68%  
(0.57) 
-14.25%  
(-1.54) 
-8.22% 
 (-1.00) 
-3.92%  
(-1.24) 
-2.79%  
(-0.42) 
-11.07%  
(-0.98) 
5.69%  
(0.40) 
-0.99%  
(-0.41) 
Frontier -7.46%  (-1.31) 
3.34%  
(0.37) 
59.03%  
(2.54) 
-2.60%  
(-0.39) 
1.46% 
 (0.34) 
-6.31%  
(-1.78) 
1.02%  
(0.36) 
1.84%  
(0.48) 
-3.06%  
(-0.68) 
5.85%  
(0.79) 
5.31% 
(0.07) 
Estonia -2.18% (-0.18) 
0.50%  
(0.04) 
43.59%  
(1.21) 
13.47%  
(0.50) 
-4.13% 
 (-0.29) 
-17.81%  
(-1.96) 
3.27%  
(0.58) 
-5.76%  
(-1.20) 
0.73% 
 (0.08) 
-4.64% 
 (-0.74) 
2.7%  
(-0.2) 
Morocco 11.92%  (0.83) 
20.50%  
(1.67) 
-3.46%  
(-0.25) 
-10.05%  
(-0.92) 
-7.16% 
 (-1.46) 
-2.89%  
(-1.13) 
-2.86%  
(-0.30) 
-5.93%  
(-0.62) 
-1.86% 
 (-1.42) 
-2.17% 
 (-1.07) 
-0.4%  
(-0.47) 
Jordan -6.88%  (-0.57) 
-0.36%  
(-0.04) 
29.07%  
(1.17) 
-12.65%  
(-1.22) 
0.07% 
 (0.01) 
-3.22%  
(-0.61) 
-4.53%  
(-1.75) 
-2.88%  
(-1.14) 
-2.6% 
 (-0.76) 
-0.29% 
 (-0.09) 
-0.43%  
(-0.50) 
Average 2.54%  (0.09) 
5.31%  
(0.09) 
22.99%  
(0.76) 
-1.39%  
(-0.21) 
-6.09% 
 (-0.76) 
-6.93%  
(-1.09) 
-1.10%  
(-0.53) 
-2.23%  
(-0.50) 
-2.42% 
 (-0.57) 
-1.27%  
(-0.37) 
0.94%  
(-0.31) 
This table reports the average OOS annualized returns and Sharpe ratios of two portfolios for IS of two years and OOS of six months after transaction costs (rolling forward by 
one month). For example, the 1.05% annualized return of the advanced markets (2006) is calculated as the average OOS annualized return of twelve portfolios. The first 
portfolio’s OOS return is calculated over the period 01/01//2006-30/06/2006 using as IS the period 01/01//2004-31/12/2005. The remaining eleven OOS returns are calculated 
by rolling forward the IS and the OOS by one month. The same logic applies for the Sharpe ratios. The last column and row present the average performance per market across 
all years and per year respectively. 
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Table 8 
Monthly Performance Persistence for IS 2 Years (1 month rolling forward) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 1.00 0.58 0.75 0.83 0.42 0.75 0.50 0.67 0.83 0.75 0.71 
US 1.17 0.42 1.08 1.08 1.33 1.17 1.00 1.92 0.83 0.25 1.03 
UK 0.92 0.58 0.50 1.08 0.42 0.58 0.08 0.75 0.42 1.00 0.63 
Japan 0.17 0.50 0.58 0.92 1.58 0.58 0.25 0.17 0.08 0.42 0.53 
Emerging 0.50 0.92 1.17 1.33 0.33 0.75 0.58 0.17 0.17 0.83 0.68 
Russia 0.42 0.25 0.17 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.92 0.33 0.44 
China 2.17 2.92 0.42 0.58 0.42 0.42 0.83 0.42 0.67 1.08 0.99 
Brazil 0.67 0.58 0.67 0.75 0.33 0.42 0.33 0.58 0.92 0.50 0.58 
Frontier 0.42 1.67 2.25 0.50 0.58 0.17 0.75 0.67 1.33 1.25 0.96 
Estonia 0.50 0.42 0.75 0.58 0.75 0.17 0.67 0.42 1.08 0.25 0.56 
Morocco 1.92 2.00 1.25 0.42 0.25 0.33 0.58 0.92 0.42 0.58 0.87 
Jordan 0.42 0.75 2.08 0.50 0.83 0.83 0.25 0.75 0.58 0.58 0.76 
Average 0.85 0.97 0.97 0.74 0.63 0.57 0.54 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.73 
This table reports the average number of consecutive months that the monthly OOS returns of the twelve portfolio returns are above the risk-free rate. This average is 
calculated by generating the monthly OOS in consecutive months for each of the twelve portfolios mentioned in Table 4. For example, in advanced markets for the first 
portfolio, we calculate the OOS returns for 2006 (January, February, etc.). If the OOS returns over the first month are below the relevant risk-free rate, we assign a 
value of 0. If the OOS returns remain above the risk-free rate during the first month e.g. in January but not for February, we assign the value of 1. Otherwise, we assign 
a value of 2 or more. This process is repeated for the remaining eleven portfolios of the year. The analysis is done using a maximum 18 months of OOS calculations 
for each portfolio. The last column and row present the average monthly performance persistence per market across all years and per year respectively. 
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Table 9  
Quarterly Performance Persistence in Months for IS 2 2 Years (3 months rolling forward) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 0.33 0.67 1.08 0.75 0.42 0.33 0.25 0.58 1.17 0.50 0.61 
US 1.17 1.00 2.58 0.42 0.58 0.50 0.58 1.67 2.17 0.42 1.11 
UK 2.17 0.58 1.17 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.75 0.42 0.50 0.69 
Japan 0.33 0.17 1.33 0.83 0.67 0.17 0.17 0.33 0.08 0.25 0.43 
Emerging 0.83 0.67 0.83 1.08 0.33 0.67 1.42 0.50 0.17 0.75 0.73 
Russia 1.50 0.50 0.83 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.92 0.25 0.83 0.33 0.65 
China 1.75 1.08 0.42 0.17 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.08 0.58 0.75 0.61 
Brazil 1.00 0.58 0.50 1.08 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.58 0.75 1.00 0.63 
Frontier 0.50 1.42 1.25 0.50 0.75 0.25 1.33 0.75 0.42 1.25 0.84 
Estonia 0.25 0.67 1.25 0.75 0.67 0.08 0.75 0.25 1.08 0.25 0.60 
Morocco 1.00 2.83 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.42 0.25 0.17 0.62 
Jordan 0.42 0.75 1.17 0.00 0.42 0.58 0.42 0.17 0.67 0.50 0.51 
Average 0.94 0.91 1.09 0.60 0.42 0.34 0.58 0.53 0.72 0.56 0.67 
This table reports the average number of consecutive months that the quarterly OOS returns of the twelve portfolio returns are above the risk-free rate. This average is 
calculated by generating the quarterly OOS in consecutive quarters for each of the twelve portfolios mentioned in Table 5. For example, in advanced markets for the first 
portfolio, we calculate the OOS returns for 2006 (January to March, February to April, etc.). If the OOS returns over the first three months are below the relevant risk-
free rate, we assign a value of 0. If the OOS returns remain above the risk-free rate only during the first 3 months of the OOS e.g. January to March but not for February 
to June, we assign the value of 1. Otherwise, we assign a value of 2 or more. This process is repeated for the remaining eleven portfolios of the year. The analysis is done 
using a maximum 18 months (6 quarters) of OOS calculations for each portfolio. The last column and row present the average performance per market across all years 
and per year respectively. 
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Table 10 
Semi-annual Performance Persistence in Months for IS 2 Years (6 months rolling forward) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 0.50 0.42 1.25 0.50 0.42 0.08 0.17 0.75 0.58 0.33 0.50 
US 1.00 0.75 1.67 0.33 0.42 0.17 1.17 2.00 1.83 0.17 0.95 
UK 1.83 0.17 0.92 0.67 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.25 0.50 0.48 
Japan 0.00 0.33 1.33 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.32 
Emerging 1.25 0.67 1.42 1.00 0.50 0.42 1.25 0.42 0.67 0.25 0.78 
Russia 1.25 0.42 1.17 0.50 0.08 0.33 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.17 0.53 
China 1.58 0.83 1.17 0.42 0.50 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.83 0.55 
Brazil 1.33 1.83 0.67 1.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.25 0.25 1.25 0.68 
Frontier 0.67 0.75 1.50 0.33 0.50 0.08 1.08 1.33 0.75 1.00 0.80 
Estonia 0.50 0.75 2.08 1.25 0.50 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.42 0.68 
Morocco 1.58 1.83 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.08 0.47 
Jordan 0.33 1.00 1.83 0.00 0.67 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.75 1.08 0.59 
Average 0.99 0.81 1.28 0.54 0.33 0.15 0.48 0.46 0.55 0.51 0.61 
This table reports the average number of consecutive months that the semi-annual OOS returns of the twelve portfolio returns are above the risk-free rate. This average is 
calculated by generating the semi-annual OOS in consecutive quarters for each of the twelve portfolios mentioned in Table 6. For example, in advanced markets for the 
first portfolio, we calculate the OOS returns for 2006 (January to June, February to July, etc.). If the OOS returns over the first six months are below the relevant risk-free 
rate, we assign a value of 0. If the OOS returns remain above the risk-free rate only during the first 6 months of the OOS e.g. January to June but not for July to December, 
we assign the value of 1. Otherwise, we assign a value of 2 or more. This process is repeated for the remaining eleven portfolios of the year. The analysis is done using a 
maximum 18 months (3 semesters) of OOS calculations for each portfolio. The last column and row present the average performance per market across all years and per 
year respectively. 
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Table 11 
Annualized Returns based on the cross-validated surviving rules (IS of 2 Years and OOS 1 Month)  
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 27.05%  (0.02%) 
23.08%  
(0.38%) 
103.68%  
(0.09%) 
93.3%  
(1%) 
45.17%  
(0.73%) 
46.44%  
(3.19%) 
36.01%  
(0.03%) 
17.92%  
(3.22%) 
21.53%  
(7.76%) 
27.87%  
(0.06%) 
44.21%  
(1.65%) 
US 8.19%  (0%) 
18.04%  
(0.01%) 
87.67%  
(0.04%) 
84.56%  
(0.33%) 
50.42%  
(0.38%) 
34.72%  
(4.82%) 
24.13%  
(0.05%) 
26.95%  
(7.41%) 
21.08% 
(17.41%) 
21.33%  
(8.32%) 
37.71%  
(3.88%) 
UK 23.8%  (9.29%) 
27.1%  
(6.91%) 
89.14%  
(0.08%) 
85.49%  
(6.76%) 
56.82%  
(7.79%) 
50.13%  
(5.17%) 
27.01%  
(0.01%) 
20.6%  
(0.03%) 
40.89%  
(4.1%) 
36.97%  
(0.07%) 
45.8%  
(4.02%) 
Japan 29.93%  (0.02%) 
6.87%  
(0.02%) 
59.93%  
(0.02%) 
66.47%  
(1.3%) 
39.6%  
(0.61%) 
32.77%  
(0.14%) 
36.79%  
(0.02%) 
29.92%  
(0.03%) 
6.11%  
(0.01%) 
9.93%  
(0.01%) 
31.83%  
(0.22%) 
Emerging 58.41%  (0.58%) 
70.48%  
(0.57%) 
163.42%  
(0.54%) 
116.68%  
(1.7%) 
51.44%  
(2.99%) 
53.04%  
(1.74%) 
39.71%  
(0.08%) 
27.96%  
(0.09%) 
30.23%  
(0.05%) 
47.04%  
(0.04%) 
65.84%  
(0.84%) 
Russia 86.02%  (4.44%) 
27.64%  
(2.67%) 
140.78%  
(0.85%) 
183.65%  
(8.59%) 
67.8%  
(6.09%) 
74.31%  
(6.62%) 
75.11%  
(0.06%) 
44.42%  
(0.11%) 
109.66%  
(0.13%) 
91.44%  
(0.23%) 
90.08%  
(2.98%) 
China 99.78%  (2.08%) 
99.23%  
(18.07%) 
170%  
(1.23%) 
104.07%  
(0.35%) 
55.13%  
(0.18%) 
49.38%  
(1.62%) 
43.64%  
(0.01%) 
27.92%  
(0.03%) 
37.37%  
(0.07%) 
78.59%  
(0.21%) 
76.51%  
(2.38%) 
Brazil 106.43%  (6.81%) 
103.96%  
(3.32%) 
172.44%  
(1.62%) 
122.07%  
(6.6%) 
65.04%  
(7.76%) 
39.45%  
(3.15%) 
36.28%  
(0.01%) 
51.21%  
(0.08%) 
59.73%  
(0.31%) 
79.44%  
(0.08%) 
83.6%  
(2.97%) 
Frontier 34.04%  (5.02%) 
45.26%  
(0.65%) 
131.42%  
(2.91%) 
90.36%  
(14.16%) 
40.02%  
(10.53%) 
30.28%  
(2.11%) 
26.5%  
(0.12%) 
25.28%  
(0.18%) 
26.89%  
(2.37%) 
35.09%  
(0.71%) 
48.51%  
(3.88%) 
Estonia 42.02%  (7.72%) 
64.11%  
(0.1%) 
246.5%  
(2.06%) 
119.29%  
(3.52%) 
141.52%  
(3.22%) 
52.77%  
(1.96%) 
43.17%  
(0.04%) 
31.11%  
(1.68%) 
51.85%  
(2.55%) 
29.85%  
(0.03%) 
82.22%  
(2.29%) 
Morocco 97.25%  (4.06%) 
42.05%  
(18.14%) 
77.99%  
(9.32%) 
51.52%  
(1.75%) 
37.84%  
(0.11%) 
16%  
(0.02%) 
36.57%  
(0.07%) 
40.51%  
(0.29%) 
10.15%  
(0.01%) 
16.5%  
(0.03%) 
42.64%  
(3.38%) 
Jordan 89.39%  (7.42%) 
45.23%  
(0.46%) 
103.32%  
(0.93%) 
52.78%  
(1.82%) 
35.76%  
(0.59%) 
37.43%  
(0.24%) 
27.1%  
(0.05%) 
14.9%  
(0.01%) 
18.51%  
(0.03%) 
22.1%  
(0.03%) 
44.65%  
(1.16%) 
Average 58.52%  (3.95%) 
47.75%  
(4.27%) 
128.86%  
(1.64%) 
97.52%  
(3.99%) 
57.21%  
(3.41%) 
43.06%  
(2.56%) 
37.67%  
(0.05%) 
29.89%  
(1.1%) 
36.17%  
(2.9%) 
41.35%  
(0.82%) 
57.80%  
(2.47%) 
This table reports the average OOS annualized returns of twelve cross-validated portfolios for IS of two years and OOS of one month after transaction costs (rolling forward 
by one month). In parentheses we report the average percentage of cross-validated rules from the genuine significant rules as identified in section 5.1. For example, Table 2 
reports that 2628 rules (0.124*21195) survive on average in the case of frontier markets (2006). This table estimates that out of those rules, 132 (0.0502*2628) survive both in 
the IS and OOS and generate an average OOS annualized return of 34.04%. 
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Table 12 
Annualized Returns based on the cross-validated surviving rules (IS of 2 Years and OOS 3 Months)  
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 12.96% (0.02%) 
15.73% 
(0.04%) 
64.58% 
(0.3%) 
36.66% 
(0.85%) 
21.51% 
(0.6%) 
22.21% 
(0.09%) 
20.42% 
(0.04%) 
12.8% 
(3.17%) 
9.11% 
(7.13%) 
12.15% 
(0.07%) 
22.81% 
(1.23%) 
US 7.35%  (0%) 
6.38%  
(0%) 
65.08% 
(0.12%) 
32.66% 
(0.25%) 
22.13% 
(0.36%) 
14.94% 
(4.77%) 
11.58% 
(0.07%) 
17.34% 
(5.61%) 
9.81% 
(25.83%) 
10.4% 
(9.17%) 
19.77% 
(4.62%) 
UK 19% (15.16%) 
22.96% 
(6.83%) 
69.49% 
(0.18%) 
46.82% 
(5.78%) 
26.64% 
(7.74%) 
18.44% 
(5.03%) 
9.38% 
(0.01%) 
16.23% 
(0.02%) 
14.79% 
(0.22%) 
20.89% 
(0.08%) 
26.46% 
(4.11%) 
Japan 10.12% (0.76%) 
3.73% 
(0.02%) 
41.04% 
(0.28%) 
43.49% 
(1.04%) 
22.62% 
(0.62%) 
12.87% 
(0.11%) 
19.49% 
(0.03%) 
11.58% 
(0.03%) 
3.39% 
(0.01%) 
5.76% 
(0.01%) 
17.41% 
(0.29%) 
Emerging 31.64% (0.43%) 
38.19% 
(0.57%) 
75.18% 
(0.63%) 
50.2% 
(1.66%) 
23.89% 
(1.71%) 
34.06% 
(4.92%) 
23.63% 
(0.07%) 
18.35% 
(0.1%) 
15.51% 
(0.04%) 
20.47% 
(0.06%) 
33.11% 
(1.02%) 
Russia 44.72% (9.77%) 
14.1% 
(6.37%) 
53.41% 
(1.04%) 
104.76% 
(12.61%) 
31.66% 
(5.06%) 
39.9% 
(3.35%) 
32.95% 
(0.07%) 
25.2% 
(0.1%) 
60.47% 
(0.13%) 
42.05% 
(0.2%) 
44.92% 
(3.87%) 
China 54.69% (2.01%) 
74.44% 
(15.23%) 
75.41% 
(0.86%) 
46.09% 
(0.36%) 
22.33% 
(0.19%) 
25.56% 
(3.19%) 
19.85% 
(0.01%) 
14.43% 
(0.03%) 
17.94% 
(0.05%) 
49.18% 
(0.27%) 
39.99% 
(2.22%) 
Brazil 57.35% (10.46%) 
68.62% 
(3.21%) 
87.29% 
(2.16%) 
57.1% 
(8.46%) 
23.59% 
(7.2%) 
13.57% 
(3.13%) 
16.7% 
(0.01%) 
29.39% 
(0.08%) 
28.77% 
(0.37%) 
43.54% 
(0.09%) 
42.59% 
(3.52%) 
Frontier 21.22% (1.96%) 
28.95% 
(0.56%) 
108.66% 
(3.44%) 
33.05% 
(14.01%) 
21.13% 
(11.5%) 
15.07% 
(2.29%) 
16.44% 
(0.14%) 
15.11% 
(0.16%) 
18.46% 
(0.73%) 
20.69% 
(0.73%) 
29.88% 
(3.55%) 
Estonia 30.96% (2.65%) 
30.7% 
(0.04%) 
99.4% 
(2.55%) 
63.69% 
(3.78%) 
49.29% 
(2.38%) 
23.41% 
(0.3%) 
20.84% 
(0.05%) 
14.3% 
(0.12%) 
27.51% 
(2.27%) 
8%  
(0.04%) 
36.81% 
(1.42%) 
Morocco 50% (2.44%) 
29.76% 
(20.98%) 
52.44% 
(6.93%) 
18.75% 
(1.65%) 
17.55% 
(0.1%) 
6.13% 
(0.02%) 
15.83% 
(0.08%) 
17.1% 
(0.24%) 
7.59% 
(0.01%) 
3.75% 
(0.01%) 
21.89% 
(3.25%) 
Jordan 41.88% (8.19%) 
21.65% 
(0.28%) 
65.41% 
(0.91%) 
16.62% 
(1.38%) 
20.99% 
(0.56%) 
17.82% 
(0.26%) 
11.97% 
(0.06%) 
11.41% 
(0.01%) 
7.3% 
(0.03%) 
7.93% 
(0.03%) 
22.3% 
(1.17%) 
Average 31.82% (4.49%) 
29.6% 
(4.51%) 
71.45% 
(1.62%) 
45.82% 
(4.32%) 
25.28% 
(3.17%) 
20.33% 
(2.29%) 
18.26% 
(0.05%) 
16.94% 
(0.81%) 
18.39% 
(3.07%) 
20.4% 
(0.9%) 
29.83% 
(2.52%) 
This table reports the average OOS annualized returns of twelve cross-validated portfolios for IS of two years and OOS of one month after transaction costs (rolling forward 
by one month). In parentheses we report the average percentage of cross-validated rules from the total pool of rules. For example, Table 2 reports that 2628 rules (0.124*21195) 
survive on average in the case of frontier markets (2006). This table estimates that out of those rules, 51 (0.0196*2628) survive both in the IS and OOS and generate an average 
OOS annualized return of 21.22%. 
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Table 13 
Annualized Returns based on the cross-validated surviving rules (IS of 2 Years and OOS 6 Months)  
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 13.22% (0.02%) 
8.9% 
(0.03%) 
45.74% 
(0.08%) 
22.7% 
(0.73%) 
12.31% 
(0.45%) 
12.04% 
(0.07%) 
10.16% 
(0.02%) 
8.82% 
(3.21%) 
5.13% 
(10.2%) 
10.06% 
(0.07%) 
14.91% 
(1.49%) 
US 4.97%  (0%) 
7.09% 
(0.01%) 
50.45% 
(0.03%) 
20.32% 
(0.18%) 
13.2% 
(0.25%) 
11.41% 
(0.07%) 
9.18% 
(0.07%) 
13.54% 
(7.34%) 
7.65% 
(27.92%) 
9.06% 
(4.63%) 
14.69% 
(4.05%) 
UK 16.89% (17.58%) 
15.15% 
(3.46%) 
57.18% 
(0.19%) 
30.06% 
(4.59%) 
17.02% 
(7.38%) 
11.72% 
(0.21%) 
7.73% 
(0.01%) 
12.62% 
(0.03%) 
10.12% 
(0.1%) 
15.6% 
(0.07%) 
19.41% 
(3.36%) 
Japan 1.65% (0.02%) 
1.17% 
(0.01%) 
40.34% 
(0.17%) 
26.61% 
(1.12%) 
12.19% 
(0.48%) 
7.81% 
(0.12%) 
10.42% 
(0.04%) 
5.66% 
(0.03%) 
2.52% 
(0.02%) 
5.63% 
(0.02%) 
11.4% 
(0.2%) 
Emerging 19.85% (0.46%) 
31.44% 
(0.77%) 
68.91% 
(0.33%) 
28.07% 
(1.49%) 
14.62% 
(3.44%) 
26.61% 
(1.8%) 
17.52% 
(0.08%) 
11.14% 
(0.12%) 
11.06% 
(0.03%) 
16.32% 
(0.05%) 
24.55% 
(0.86%) 
Russia 23.72% (9.25%) 
10%  
(5.9%) 
60.63% 
(1.2%) 
59.59% 
(10.61%) 
21.97% 
(4.92%) 
21.17% 
(3.3%) 
18.7% 
(0.06%) 
14.59% 
(0.08%) 
42.1% 
(0.11%) 
27.76% 
(0.22%) 
30.02% 
(3.56%) 
China 36.6% (2.42%) 
56.76% 
(14.35%) 
54.33% 
(0.7%) 
24.73% 
(0.38%) 
12.09% 
(1.74%) 
14.03% 
(0.08%) 
8.3% 
(0.01%) 
9.2% 
(0.02%) 
17.33% 
(0.06%) 
30.88% 
(0.28%) 
26.42% 
(2%) 
Brazil 26.05% (6.44%) 
50.74% 
(5.66%) 
57.57% 
(2.61%) 
33.43% 
(10.36%) 
13.81% 
(5.86%) 
12.13% 
(0.06%) 
10.35% 
(0.01%) 
20.98% 
(0.13%) 
18.28% 
(0.3%) 
49.05% 
(0.1%) 
29.24% 
(3.15%) 
Frontier 16.76% (1.61%) 
18.92% 
(0.52%) 
86.73% 
(2.72%) 
19.73% 
(13.14%) 
12.41% 
(13.1%) 
9.47% 
(0.73%) 
11.17% 
(0.14%) 
13.55% 
(0.23%) 
10.2% 
(0.46%) 
16.49% 
(0.54%) 
21.54% 
(3.32%) 
Estonia 23.28% (1.38%) 
25.66% 
(0.05%) 
78.2% 
(1.96%) 
43.24% 
(4.44%) 
23.12% 
(2.67%) 
12.24% 
(0.25%) 
14.04% 
(0.07%) 
6.54% 
(0.11%) 
17.91% 
(1.56%) 
7.16% 
(0.04%) 
25.14% 
(1.25%) 
Morocco 35.66% (2.28%) 
22.89% 
(25.24%) 
34.85% 
(5.99%) 
9.48% 
(1.34%) 
12.06% 
(0.07%) 
4.82% 
(0.02%) 
9.27% 
(0.1%) 
11.46% 
(0.07%) 
1.84% 
(0.01%) 
3.39% 
(0.02%) 
14.57% 
(3.51%) 
Jordan 26.1% (7.34%) 
14.5% 
(0.24%) 
54% 
(1.05%) 
10.79% 
(1.03%) 
13.75% 
(0.58%) 
10.64% 
(0.23%) 
5.9% 
(0.04%) 
5.08% 
(0.01%) 
6.5% 
(0.02%) 
5.79% 
(0.03%) 
15.31% 
(1.06%) 
Average 20.4% (4.07%) 
21.94% 
(4.69%) 
57.41% 
(1.42%) 
27.4% 
(4.12%) 
14.88% 
(3.41%) 
12.84% 
(0.58%) 
11.06% 
(0.06%) 
11.1% 
(0.95%) 
12.55% 
(3.4%) 
16.43% 
(0.51%) 
20.6% 
(2.32%) 
This table reports the average OOS annualized returns of twelve cross-validated portfolios for IS of two years and OOS of one month after transaction costs (rolling forward 
by one month). In parentheses we report the average percentage of cross-validated rules from the total pool of rules. For example, Table 2 reports that 2628 rules (0.124*21195) 
survive on average in the case of frontier markets (2006). This table estimates that out of those rules, 42 (0.0161*2628) survive both in the IS and OOS and generate an average 
OOS annualized return of 16.76%. 
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Table 14 
Financial Stress Performance  
Market  Period 
 
Financial Stress 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
US 
IS of 2 Y
ears - O
O
S 1 M
onth 
High - -9.96% (-0.59) 
22.72% 
(0.77) 
-3.64% 
(-0.19) 
-18.27% 
(-2.18) 
-0.57% 
(-0.17) 
-5.08% 
(-2.16) - - 
-3.86% 
(-0.75) 
-2.67% 
(-0.75) 
Low 1.81% 
(0.2) 
-3.36% 
(-0.32) - - 
-0.28% 
(-0.02) 
-2.42% 
(-0.39) 
0.53% 
(0.18) 
7.02% 
(1.31) 
5.73% 
(0.77) 
-5.41% 
(-0.71) 
0.45% 
(0.13) 
Other Advanced 
High - -0.72% (-0.06) 
10.63% 
(0.41) 
4.14% 
(0.25) 
-16.24% 
(-2.88) 
-2.15% 
(-0.55) 
-4.86% 
(-1.81) - - 
-0.37% 
(-0.07) 
-1.37% 
(-0.59) 
Low -3.66% 
(-0.54) 
-6.02% 
(-0.57) - - 
-33.23% 
(-3.59) 
0.61% 
(0.16) 
0.11% 
(0.05) 
0.35% 
(0.13) 
-2.07% 
(-0.42) 
-1.53% 
(-0.85) 
-5.68% 
(-0.7) 
Emerging 
 
High - -13.42% (-4.45) 
43.52% 
(1.1) 
1.78% 
(0.11) 
-20.32% 
(-3.13) 
-4.89% 
(-0.69) 
3% 
(0.74) 
26.12% 
(4.45) 
-4.83% 
(-4.01) 
-1.48% 
(-0.37) 
3.28% 
(-0.69) 
Low 1.75% 
(0.15) 
-0.82% 
(-0.06) - 
7.8% 
(0.7) 
-4.37% 
(-0.66) 
-1.87% 
(-0.36) 
-3.65% 
(-0.94) 
-3.94% 
(-1.45) 
-3.61% 
(-1.21) 
0.48% 
(0.29) 
-0.91% 
(-0.39) 
This table reports the average OOS annualized returns and Sharpe ratios of the portfolios generated in Section 5.1. High and low correspond to high and low financial stress conditions as 
reported by the OFR stress indices. – indicates that for this year and market there were no periods with high (or low) financial stress. 
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Table A.1  
Annualized mean excess returns for quartiles of different combination of Sharpe ratio levels.  
Outperforming SR Quartile 
Underperforming SR 
-2 -3 -4 
Outperforming Underperforming Outperforming Underperforming Outperforming Underperforming 
2 
1st 6.50 -8.93  6.80  -16.28 6.60  -24.69 
2nd 16.28 -16.08  16.92 -23.84 16.51 -32.74 
3rd 19.14 -22.55 19.83 -30.71 19.25 -39.62 
3 
1st 11.51 -8.69 11.37 -16.83 11.43 -24.64 
2nd 25.14 -15.86 24.63 -24.52 24.81 -32.82 
3rd 27.94 -22.53 27.38 -31.05 27.54 -39.55 
4 
1st 16.44 -8.88 16.32 -16.66 16.64 -24.19 
2nd 33.56  -16.00 33.43 -24.34 34.22 -32.23 
3rd 36.19 -22.47 36.08 -30.97 36.90 -39.13 
This table reports the quartiles of the distribution of the annualized mean excess return (in percentages) induced by positive and negative Sharpe ratio pairs applied in 
the Monte Carlo simulations for the out- and under-performing strategies. The pairs are created with the annualized Sharpe ratio for out- and under-performing rules 
set to 2, 3, 4 and -2, -3, -4 respectively. The quantities presented correspond to the average values over 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. The proportion of rules that are 
neutrally performing (휋!), outperforming (휋훢") and underperforming (휋훢#) and are set to 50%, 20% and 30% respectively. 
Table.A2  
Estimation of neutral, positive, and negative proportions by the DFDR+/- procedure versus the actual ones.  
Outperforming SR Proportion Underperforming SR -2 -3 -4 
2 
휋! = 50% 73.08 62.93 60.97 
휋훢" = 20% 9.39 11.91 11.17 
휋훢# = 30% 17.53 25.17 27.86 
3 
휋! = 50% 66.43 57.09 53.44 
휋훢" = 20% 14.35 15.23 16.09 
휋훢# = 30% 19.22 27.68 30.47 
4 
휋! = 50% 64.35 53.55 50.21 
휋훢" = 20% 16.28 18.08 18.89 
휋훢# = 30% 19.37 28.36 30.91 
The quantities presented correspond to the average values estimated over 1000 Monte Carlo simulations. The proportion of rules that are neutrally performing (휋!), 
outperforming (휋훢") and underperforming (휋훢#) are set to 50%, 20% and 30% respectively. The table provides the estimates when the annualized Sharpe ratio for out- and 
under-performing rules is set to 2, 3, 4 and -2, -3, -4 respectively. 
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Table A.3 
True false discovery rate, accuracy and the positive-performing portfolio size through different methods.  
Outperforming  
SR Portfolio Type 
Underperforming SR 
-2 -3 -4 
FDR+ Power Portfolio size FDR+ Power Portfolio size FDR+ Power Portfolio size 
2 
10%-DFDR+ 12.92 39.46 1995.71 12.67 42.01 2118.86 12.05 40.31 2014.43 
10%-FDR 16.36 11.75 896.75 14.14 11.98 941.47 14.61 11.91 883.09 
20%-DFDR+ 13.79 39.92 2110.78 15.03 43.3 2369.41 14.65 41.66 2281.92 
20%-FDR 16.12 16.67 896.75 13.95 17.69 941.47 14.63  16.15 883.09  
5%-RW 0.86 0.01 0.53 0.90 0.01 0.52 0.71 0.01 0.48 
20%-RW 8.42 0.05 3.03 8.28 0.06 3.33 7.11 0.05 2.90 
3 
10%-DFDR + 8.44 64.74 3076.41 8.00 64.74 3048.45 8.78 62.89 3039.27 
10%-FDR 8.29 29.61 1856.71 7.3 30.27 1906.89 7.59 31.46 1945.02  
20%-DFDR+ 9.54 65.29 3212.88 10.59 66.30 3321.58 11.55 64.62 3343.04 
20%-FDR 8.89 38.26  1856.71  7.9  39.86  1906.89 8.25  40.11  1945.02 
5%-RW 0.31 0.01 0.52 0.04 0.01 0.60 0.08 0.01 0.57 
20%-RW 3.21 0.07 3.47 2.30 0.07 3.41 2.97 0.07 3.49 
4 
10%-DFDR+ 6.45 82.39 3790.07 6.62 83.57 3879.56 7.83 83.01 3945.84 
10%-FDR 4.85  56.8  3187.43  4.56  54.55  3012.02 4.50 55.99  3138.75  
20%-DFDR+ 7.80 83.35 3948.29 9.53 85.49 4194.29 10.5 84.89 4244.14 
20%-FDR 6.63 68.06  3187.43 5.6  65.59  3012.02 5.96 67.98 3138.75  
5%-RW 0.00 0.02 0.65 0.01 0.02 0.73 0.00 0.02 0.68 
20%-RW 0.53 0.09 3.87 0.31 0.10 4.38 0.34 0.09 3.73 
This table reports the FDR+ and accuracy in percentages and the portfolio size (out of 21195). Accuracy is estimated by the ratio of actual outperformers discovered by the 
underlying procedure. We consider confidence target levels of 10% and 20% for the DFDR+ and benchmark it against the FDR procedure in Storey et al. (2004) for the 
same target levels. The second benchmark is the FWER procedure by RW tested at the levels 5% and 20%. The quantities refer to average values over 1000 Monte Carlo 
simulations for different combinations pairs, when annualized Sharpe ratio for out- and under-performing rules is set to 2, 3, 4 and -2, -3, -4 respectively.  
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Table B.1   
Percentage and standard deviation of the DFDR+/- procedure survivors (IS 1 year).  
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 1.37  (2.82) 
0.20 
 (0.20) 
1.34 
 (3.22) 
5.44 
 (4.12) 
4.32  
(7.72) 
2.10 
 (5.26) 
0.42  
(0.20) 
8.93  
(11.28) 
7.72  
(12.61) 
0.45  
(0.12) 
3.23  
(4.76) 
US 0.02  (0.02) 
0.11 
 (0.12) 
0.57 
 (1.27) 
2.53 
 (2.68) 
6.02  
(9.25) 
2.15 
 (5.61) 
2.06  
(5.34) 
16.75 
(15.89) 
16.24 
(16.68) 
0.32  
(0.13) 
4.68  
(5.70) 
UK 11.52  (6.91) 
14.52 
(11.99) 
2.75 
 (6.43) 
39.02 
 (9.20) 
13.40  
(14.60) 
0.57 
 (0.23) 
0.24  
(0.07) 
2.29  
(6.25) 
3.17  
(8.59) 
0.37  
(0.11) 
8.78  
(6.44) 
Japan 13.19 (13.86) 
1.26 
 (2.59) 
2.70 
 (4.57) 
7.01 
 (2.60) 
4.90  
(7.97) 
0.66 
 (0.22) 
0.49  
(0.20) 
2.27  
(5.30) 
0.23  
(0.10) 
0.44  
(0.15) 
3.32  
(3.76) 
Emerging 4.87  (9.35) 
1.94 
 (2.38) 
1.01 
 (1.33) 
6.74  
(5.01) 
10.21 
(11.65) 
0.48 
 (0.30) 
0.61  
(0.19) 
0.37  
(0.21) 
0.32  
(0.17) 
0.53  
(0.67) 
2.71  
(3.12) 
Russia 31.04  (19.00) 
1.92 
 (3.65) 
2.81  
(6.59) 
33.80 
(12.19) 
11.24 
(12.74) 
2.65  
(5.77) 
0.75  
(0.45) 
0.94  
(0.63) 
0.96  
(0.38) 
1.39  
(0.77) 
8.75  
(6.22) 
China 7.34  (8.51) 
27.46 
(23.36) 
0.96  
(0.61) 
2.90 
 (5.44) 
5.68 
 (9.01) 
0.46  
(0.70) 
0.37  
(0.08) 
0.91  
(0.47) 
0.31  
(0.25) 
5.60  
(9.06) 
5.20 
 (5.75) 
Brazil 33.66 (30.99) 
8.85 
 (12.55) 
16.00 
(15.17) 
34.05  
(9.11) 
10.67 
(11.65) 
0.26  
(0.20) 
0.40  
(0.40) 
0.97  
(0.53) 
1.44  
(0.61) 
1.24  
(1.46) 
10.75  
(8.27) 
Frontier 9.18  (14.08) 
6.12 
 (8.23) 
3.58  
(9.53) 
38.73 
(14.25) 
7.03 
 (8.80) 
1.64  
(0.80) 
0.51  
(0.30) 
3.05  
(5.17) 
8.17  
(9.53) 
2.80  
(1.58) 
8.08  
(7.23) 
Estonia 0.66  (1.28) 
0.83 
 (0.50) 
6.04 
 (9.17) 
7.08 
 (5.44) 
10.04 
(10.78) 
1.09  
(0.98) 
0.47  
(0.30) 
25.02  
(8.96) 
1.76  
(2.35) 
1.50 
 (2.86) 
5.45  
(4.26) 
Morocco 19.28 (22.47) 
4.67 
 (4.39) 
12.35 
(10.54) 
2.02 
 (1.55) 
0.31  
(0.23) 
0.18  
(0.06) 
1.84  
(2.17) 
0.22  
(0.06) 
0.42  
(0.16) 
0.59  
(0.82) 
4.19  
(4.24) 
Jordan 0.89  (1.19) 
1.25 
 (1.03) 
2.38  
(2.98) 
4.38 
 (2.67) 
0.39  
(0.11) 
0.82  
(0.96) 
0.35  
(0.13) 
0.26  
(0.21) 
0.27  
(0.10) 
0.38  
(0.21) 
1.14  
(0.96) 
Average 11.08 (10.87) 
5.76  
(5.92) 
4.37 
 (5.95) 
15.31 
 (6.19) 
7.02  
(8.71) 
1.09  
(1.76) 
0.71  
(0.82) 
5.17  
(4.58) 
3.42  
(4.29) 
1.30  
(1.49) 
5.52  
(5.06) 
This table reports the percentage and standard deviations of the survivor rules adjusted based on the number of the total number rules. For example, in 2006 for the advanced 
market the surviving rules are 290 (0.0137*21195) and their standard deviation is 598 (0.0282*21195). The average is estimated from the twelve portfolios whose OOS is in 
2006. The first portfolio’s IS runs from 01/01/2004-31/12/2005 and the remaining eleven are calculated by rolling forward the IS by one month.  
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Table B.2  
Annualized Returns and Sharpe Ratios after Transaction Costs (IS 1 Year) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 16.19% (2.04) 
16.91% 
(1.97) 
23.67% 
(1.92) 
50.74% 
(2.18) 
16.38% 
(2.36) 
14.66% 
(2.13) 
12.49% 
(2.27) 
15.27% 
(2.28) 
9.74% 
(2.31) 
7.01% 
(3.14) 
18.31% 
(2.26) 
US 11.78% (1.35) 
14.38% 
(1.56) 
23.21% 
(1.43) 
48.31% 
(1.65) 
16.47% 
(1.86) 
15.01% 
(2.21) 
12.84% 
(2.20) 
14.94% 
(2.03) 
12.91% 
(1.84) 
5.48% 
(2.33) 
17.53% 
(1.85) 
UK 10.71% (1.31) 
15.37% 
(1.52) 
18.59% 
(0.95) 
49.79% 
(1.41) 
22.49% 
(1.86) 
19.64% 
(1.97) 
7.26% 
(2.42) 
12.81% 
(2.04) 
11.88% 
(2.58) 
11.17% 
(2.85) 
17.97% 
(1.89) 
Japan 23.33% (1.36) 
13.65% 
(0.93) 
13.77% 
(1.04) 
34.03% 
(1.39) 
12.38% 
(1.31) 
15.59% 
(1.68) 
7.84% 
(2.21) 
16.86% 
(1.90) 
5.81% 
(2.35) 
8.31% 
(2.19) 
15.16% 
(1.64) 
Emerging 29.38% (2.6) 
33.62% 
(2.51) 
41.64% 
(2.19) 
69.6% 
(2.51) 
20.41% 
(2.54) 
18.18% 
(2.35) 
21.84% 
(2.49) 
15.57% 
(2.59) 
9.46% 
(2.46) 
13.92% 
(2.48) 
27.36% 
(2.47) 
Russia 39.42% (1.26) 
26.95% 
(1.19) 
28.83% 
(0.95) 
99.79% 
(1.78) 
27.57% 
(1.43) 
28.66% 
(2.12) 
31.19% 
(2.26) 
23.39% 
(2.02) 
17.13% 
(2.23) 
47.18% 
(2.18) 
37.01% 
(1.74) 
China 34.17% (2.22) 
41.65% 
(2.32) 
55.04% 
(2.10) 
69.05% 
(1.90) 
19.00% 
(1.86) 
10.95% 
(1.98) 
13.55% 
(2.70) 
19.17% 
(2.07) 
18.40% 
(2.34) 
23.90% 
(1.97) 
30.49% 
(2.14) 
Brazil 28.63% (1.42) 
31.85% 
(1.22) 
40.21% 
(1.22) 
68.74% 
(1.51) 
24.13% 
(1.88) 
12.54% 
(1.76) 
29.99% 
(2.48) 
17.52% 
(2.17) 
21.09% 
(2.48) 
32.27% 
(1.69) 
30.7% 
(1.78) 
Frontier 24.2% (2.69) 
25.08% 
(2.63) 
28.36% 
(2.27) 
55.37% 
(2.87) 
21.1% 
(3.21) 
16.34% 
(2.53) 
13.5%  
(2.30) 
12.6% 
(2.82) 
10.67% 
(2.85) 
17.95% 
(2.46) 
22.52% 
(2.66) 
Estonia 18.92% (1.87) 
38.79% 
(2.27) 
44.25% 
(2.25) 
75.54% 
(2.36) 
38.34% 
(2.14) 
33.91% 
(2.17) 
15.69% 
(2.35) 
19.76% 
(1.93) 
11.87% 
(1.63) 
15.01% 
(1.89) 
31.21% 
(2.09) 
Morocco 36.42% (3.04) 
39.55% 
(2.48) 
32.95% 
(2.13) 
37.99% 
(2.16) 
12.64% 
(2.35) 
8.85% 
(2.31) 
18.02% 
(1.64) 
6.82% 
(2.35) 
8.32% 
(2.04) 
9.68% 
(1.31) 
21.12% 
(2.18) 
Jordan 41.04% (2.21) 
29.06% 
(1.92) 
32.41% 
(2.15) 
46.15% 
(2.02) 
16.23% 
(2.40) 
17.99% 
(2.28) 
12.73% 
(2.21) 
8.33% 
(1.99) 
10.38% 
(1.84) 
5.46% 
(2.54) 
21.98% 
(2.16) 
Average 26.18% (1.95) 
27.24% 
(1.88) 
31.91% 
(1.72) 
58.76% 
(1.98) 
20.60%  
(2.10) 
17.69% 
(2.12) 
16.41% 
(2.30) 
15.25% 
(2.18) 
12.31% 
(2.25) 
16.45% 
(2.25) 
24.28% 
(2.07) 
This table reports the average IS annualized returns and Sharpe ratios of twelve portfolios for one year of IS after transaction costs (rolling forward by one month). For example, 
the 16.19% annualized return of the advanced markets (2006) is calculated as the average IS annualized return of twelve portfolios. The first portfolio’s IS return is calculated 
over the period of 01/01/2005-31/12/2005. The remaining eleven are calculated by rolling forward the IS by one month. The same logic applies for the Sharpe ratios. The last 
column and row present the average performance per market across all years and per year respectively.  
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Table B.3 
Percentage decomposition of RSI rules among the DFDR+/- procedure survivors (IS 2 Years) 
Average of RSI % 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Advanced 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 0.53% 1.63% 1.27% 6.32% 0.43% 0.15% 39.29% 
US 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.16% 1.94% 0.28% 3.34% 0.20% 0.15% 0.44% 
UK 0.28% 0.57% 0.37% 0.77% 0.68% 1.23% 42.37% 12.28% 0.94% 41.37% 
Japan 0.00% 0.00% 0.34% 1.40% 5.30% 7.62% 8.17% 11.30% 27.41% 21.55% 
Emerging 0.16% 0.03% 0.00% 0.61% 0.68% 0.81% 9.17% 3.84% 17.56% 27.83% 
Russia 0.00% 0.02% 0.62% 1.13% 1.81% 1.58% 3.91% 12.21% 8.24% 6.21% 
China 0.05% 0.01% 0.00% 1.18% 0.85% 1.59% 19.66% 6.66% 2.50% 4.45% 
Brazil 0.23% 0.00% 0.15% 0.78% 0.91% 1.70% 43.46% 3.30% 4.32% 16.01% 
Frontier 0.00% 0.18% 0.10% 0.16% 0.64% 1.68% 12.74% 13.14% 1.39% 1.88% 
Estonia 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.05% 0.95% 0.80% 8.58% 1.09% 0.37% 0.89% 
Morocco 0.13% 0.01% 0.00% 0.08% 8.04% 34.85% 4.93% 1.82% 40.05% 8.23% 
Jordan 0.02% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 1.45% 16.44% 37.27% 58.55% 28.72% 26.73% 
Grand Total 0.08% 0.08% 0.13% 0.74% 2.07% 5.82% 16.66% 10.40% 10.99% 16.24% 
This table reports the contribution (in percentage terms) of RSI rules to the DFDR+/- procedure survivors for every single year examined. For every year, the IS 
portfolio runs for two years and the remaining eleven are calculated by rolling forward the IS by one month.  
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Table B.4 
Percentage decomposition of filter rules among the DFDR+/- procedure survivors (IS 2 Years) 
Average of FR % 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Advanced 5.36% 2.88% 5.25% 22.20% 19.37% 3.94% 8.99% 2.47% 1.46% 13.53% 
US 50.00% 17.78% 8.50% 5.00% 7.28% 2.18% 10.99% 2.44% 2.48% 1.77% 
UK 5.82% 2.58% 0.00% 34.85% 24.11% 3.10% 6.24% 14.32% 3.06% 19.14% 
Japan 1.20% 0.00% 6.51% 11.77% 18.37% 20.52% 7.49% 10.58% 3.29% 9.52% 
Emerging 10.22% 21.58% 30.87% 32.25% 19.39% 5.11% 36.13% 25.96% 21.69% 16.50% 
Russia 4.06% 3.27% 26.58% 32.41% 36.58% 3.85% 24.44% 26.30% 11.78% 13.47% 
China 3.96% 5.15% 5.77% 11.14% 2.56% 3.09% 13.15% 17.31% 15.03% 9.97% 
Brazil 9.04% 0.51% 5.07% 17.07% 25.09% 3.24% 8.86% 18.34% 16.25% 6.16% 
Frontier 5.30% 21.67% 12.69% 14.68% 16.85% 8.15% 26.43% 38.02% 9.49% 14.65% 
Estonia 4.60% 21.71% 6.71% 5.36% 11.41% 5.73% 5.23% 4.70% 5.83% 5.24% 
Morocco 8.28% 2.53% 1.43% 2.23% 9.14% 8.04% 0.34% 9.15% 8.87% 11.15% 
Jordan 3.82% 7.21% 10.79% 8.76% 6.14% 9.69% 13.30% 12.82% 10.03% 10.02% 
Grand Total 9.31% 8.91% 10.01% 16.48% 16.36% 6.39% 13.47% 15.20% 9.11% 10.93% 
This table reports the contribution (in percentage terms) of filter rules to the DFDR+/- procedure survivors for every single year examined. For every year, the IS 
portfolio runs for two years and the remaining eleven are calculated by rolling forward the IS by one month.  
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Table B.5 
Percentage profitability of moving average rules among the DFDR+/- procedure survivors (IS 2 Years) 
Average of MA % 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Advanced 71.94% 82.47% 78.36% 57.38% 50.75% 88.23% 23.96% 90.22% 92.52% 22.00% 
US 6.25% 8.89% 78.16% 71.88% 63.52% 92.80% 24.34% 89.08% 89.08% 90.59% 
UK 81.59% 84.10% 93.72% 35.79% 41.75% 86.49% 34.62% 41.69% 88.68% 19.68% 
Japan 89.63% 51.11% 68.63% 42.85% 18.41% 21.88% 35.69% 26.96% 12.28% 23.56% 
Emerging 67.93% 40.98% 49.19% 31.89% 51.60% 86.35% 20.00% 25.15% 31.20% 25.50% 
Russia 91.05% 91.08% 55.69% 40.09% 31.86% 87.68% 20.81% 17.95% 21.59% 27.55% 
China 84.00% 80.75% 77.00% 61.10% 88.94% 88.69% 21.92% 32.10% 54.53% 47.02% 
Brazil 78.54% 92.85% 75.61% 47.24% 46.92% 90.42% 34.60% 32.52% 24.52% 40.89% 
Frontier 77.13% 27.74% 67.94% 59.69% 52.33% 73.86% 30.68% 12.48% 78.98% 47.96% 
Estonia 78.76% 32.18% 74.36% 77.91% 61.81% 82.08% 50.21% 81.64% 77.24% 77.25% 
Morocco 67.01% 88.31% 88.22% 83.70% 55.28% 19.57% 81.08% 59.27% 22.58% 28.34% 
Jordan 79.08% 76.36% 67.15% 74.73% 72.38% 50.38% 37.27% 9.40% 42.21% 32.29% 
Grand Total 72.74% 63.07% 72.84% 57.02% 52.96% 72.37% 34.60% 43.21% 52.95% 40.22% 
This table reports the contribution (in percentage terms) of moving average rules to the DFDR+/- procedure survivors for every single year examined. For every 
year, the IS portfolio runs for two years and the remaining eleven are calculated by rolling forward the IS by one month.  
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Table B.6 
Percentage decomposition of support and resistance rules among the DFDR+/- procedure survivors (IS 2 Years) 
Average of SR % 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Advanced 7.45% 5.32% 7.18% 7.61% 12.16% 1.67% 16.47% 2.25% 0.99% 11.88% 
US 31.25% 4.44% 5.10% 12.81% 10.70% 0.99% 31.02% 2.07% 1.29% 1.01% 
UK 4.12% 4.01% 4.43% 11.34% 10.73% 3.37% 0.00% 2.30% 2.89% 14.69% 
Japan 3.55% 0.00% 7.54% 14.40% 28.47% 32.45% 23.57% 37.39% 44.96% 31.83% 
Emerging 7.82% 5.94% 6.54% 12.26% 10.29% 3.16% 25.41% 29.49% 19.01% 19.83% 
Russia 3.05% 2.43% 6.91% 8.26% 9.18% 2.65% 41.90% 34.56% 49.05% 35.24% 
China 3.28% 3.39% 8.14% 11.40% 2.24% 3.93% 44.13% 38.76% 22.93% 29.51% 
Brazil 3.28% 3.19% 7.70% 10.90% 8.50% 2.74% 13.08% 28.94% 27.41% 27.34% 
Frontier 8.10% 25.65% 7.16% 9.67% 11.94% 5.84% 21.87% 24.96% 5.15% 21.97% 
Estonia 7.38% 22.49% 7.29% 8.00% 13.53% 6.90% 31.38% 9.87% 8.86% 11.97% 
Morocco 6.13% 2.14% 3.13% 9.06% 20.12% 34.05% 13.65% 21.45% 24.73% 49.36% 
Jordan 8.43% 13.61% 15.47% 12.17% 15.34% 11.92% 8.43% 16.67% 14.53% 24.94% 
Grand Total 7.82% 7.72% 7.22% 10.66% 12.77% 9.14% 22.58% 20.73% 18.48% 23.30% 
This table reports the contribution (in percentage terms) of support and resistance rules to the DFDR+/- procedure survivors for every single year examined. For 
every year, the IS portfolio runs for two years and the remaining eleven are calculated by rolling forward the IS by one month.  
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Table B.7 
Percentage decomposition of channel breakout rules among the DFDR+/- procedure survivors (IS 2 Years) 
Average of CB % 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Advanced 15.13% 9.33% 9.21% 12.28% 16.09% 4.89% 44.26% 4.64% 4.88% 13.29% 
US 12.50% 68.89% 8.25% 8.15% 16.57% 3.75% 30.32% 6.21% 7.01% 6.19% 
UK 8.20% 8.73% 1.48% 17.26% 22.74% 5.81% 16.77% 29.41% 4.43% 5.12% 
Japan 5.62% 48.89% 16.97% 29.58% 29.45% 17.54% 25.07% 13.77% 12.06% 13.53% 
Emerging 13.86% 31.47% 13.40% 22.98% 18.05% 4.57% 9.28% 15.56% 10.54% 10.33% 
Russia 1.84% 3.19% 10.19% 18.11% 20.57% 4.24% 8.94% 8.98% 9.33% 17.53% 
China 8.71% 10.70% 9.09% 15.18% 5.41% 2.71% 1.13% 5.18% 5.01% 9.05% 
Brazil 8.91% 3.45% 11.48% 24.01% 18.58% 1.91% 0.00% 16.91% 27.49% 9.61% 
Frontier 9.47% 24.76% 12.11% 15.79% 18.23% 10.48% 8.28% 11.40% 4.99% 13.54% 
Estonia 9.25% 23.61% 11.62% 8.68% 12.30% 4.49% 4.60% 2.70% 7.71% 4.65% 
Morocco 18.44% 7.01% 7.22% 4.92% 7.42% 3.49% 0.00% 8.30% 3.76% 2.93% 
Jordan 8.65% 2.70% 6.59% 4.35% 4.69% 11.57% 3.75% 2.56% 4.50% 6.01% 
Grand Total 10.05% 20.23% 9.80% 15.11% 15.84% 6.29% 12.70% 10.47% 8.48% 9.31% 
This table reports the contribution (in percentage terms) of channel breakout rules to the DFDR+/- procedure survivors for every single year examined. For every 
year, the IS portfolio runs for two years and the remaining eleven are calculated by rolling forward the IS by one month.  
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Table B.8 
Annualized Returns and Sharpe Ratios after Transaction Costs (IS 1 Year and OOS 1 Month) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced 11.09% (1.27) 
-15.38%  
(-1.66) 
3.43% 
(0.16) 
3.68% 
(0.25) 
-8.94%  
(-1.96) 
-13.85%  
(-1.67) 
-2.57%  
(-0.87) 
6.76% 
(1.09) 
-6.95%  
(-1.77) 
-3.07%  
(-1.15) 
-2.58%  
(-0.63) 
US 8.51% (0.96) 
-13.79%  
(-1.11) 
5.5%  
(0.21) 
0.28% 
(0.02) 
-9.76%  
(-1.47) 
-12.72%  
(-1.55) 
-1.17%  
(-0.35) 
11.66% 
(1.55) 
0.51% 
(0.08) 
-0.56%  
(-0.3) 
-1.15%  
(-0.2) 
UK 16.38% (1.49) 
1.7%  
(0.17) 
7.01% 
(0.31) 
19.95% 
(1.1) 
-13.86%  
(-2.08) 
-11.93%  
(-1.09) 
-2.91%  
(-2.43) 
-2.07%  
(-0.36) 
-5.19%  
(-1.27) 
-4.14%  
(-0.92) 
0.49% 
(-0.51) 
Japan -10.2%  (-0.63) 
-4.73%  
(-0.77) 
19.12% 
(0.67) 
2.08% 
(0.09) 
-7.74%  
(-1.41) 
-13.7%  
(-1.64) 
-2.77%  
(-1.62) 
-2.29%  
(-0.19) 
-6.09%  
(-3.11) 
-4.72%  
(-0.91) 
-3.11%  
(-0.95) 
Emerging 3.72% (0.31) 
7.74% 
(0.44) 
23.23% 
(0.64) 
0.81% 
(0.05) 
-7.53%  
(-1.25) 
-14.17%  
(-2.25) 
-8.37%  
(-1.86) 
-3.3%  
(-0.95) 
-9.02%  
(-2.94) 
-4.63%  
(-0.79) 
-1.15%  
(-0.86) 
Russia 10.33% (0.43) 
-8.26%  
(-0.9) 
49.31% 
(0.83) 
9.41% 
(0.36) 
-10.31%  
(-1.04) 
-27.52%  
(-2.51) 
-3.66%  
(-0.51) 
-5.97%  
(-0.9) 
8.68% 
(0.43) 
-15.74%  
(-1.27) 
0.63%  
(-0.51) 
China 58.42% (2.72) 
13.24% 
(0.57) 
-0.35%  
(-0.01) 
-13.12%  
(-0.69) 
-10.18%  
(-1.41) 
-19.89%  
(-2.41) 
-2.99%  
(-1.57) 
-6.18%  
(-0.93) 
-8.73%  
(-1.12) 
11.91% 
(0.77) 
2.21%  
(-0.41) 
Brazil -10.06%  (-0.43) 
17.71% 
(0.67) 
84.71% 
(1.47) 
21.25% 
(0.98) 
-12.27%  
(-1.62) 
-18.28%  
(-2.17) 
-14.19%  
(-2.37) 
-3.53%  
(-0.63) 
-4.38%  
(-0.36) 
9.01%  
(0.4) 
7%  
(-0.41) 
Frontier -12.23%  (-1.35) 
15.77% 
(1.53) 
33.12% 
(1.56) 
11.75% 
(1.15) 
4.54%  
(1.1) 
-2.12%  
(-0.36) 
-7.06%  
(-2.01) 
-4.42%  
(-1.16) 
0.68% 
(0.13) 
9.22% 
(1.18) 
4.93% 
(0.18) 
Estonia -18.25%  (-1.59) 
-8.47%  
(-0.55) 
68.02% 
(1.5) 
12.74% 
(0.52) 
1.8%  
(0.13) 
-6.9%  
(-0.42) 
1.27%  
(0.2) 
-3.46%  
(-0.43) 
6.46% 
(0.67) 
-14.41%  
(-2.55) 
3.88%  
(-0.25) 
Morocco 19.55% (1.26) 
7.48%  
(0.6) 
32.43% 
(1.41) 
-4.1%  
(-0.34) 
-5.82%  
(-1.52) 
-6.47%  
(-1.65) 
2.66% 
(0.22) 
-6.1%  
(-2.37) 
-1.88%  
(-1.21) 
-3.56%  
(-0.56) 
3.42%  
(-0.42) 
Jordan -8.63%  (-0.57) 
2.5%  
(0.27) 
39.35% 
(1.31) 
-7.1%  
(-0.6) 
-5.33%  
(-1.44) 
-4.97%  
(-0.72) 
-5.6%  
(-1.27) 
-5.18%  
(-1.26) 
-4.02%  
(-0.94) 
-2.6%  
(-1.24) 
-0.16%  
(-0.64) 
Average 5.72% (0.32) 
1.29%  
(-0.06) 
30.41% 
(0.84) 
4.8% 
(0.24) 
-7.12%  
(-1.16) 
-12.71%  
(-1.54) 
-3.95%  
(-1.2) 
-2.01%  
(-0.55) 
-2.49%  
(-0.95) 
-1.94%  
(-0.61) 
1.20%  
(-0.47) 
This table reports the average OOS annualized returns and Sharpe ratios of twelve portfolios for one year of IS and one month of OOS after transaction costs (rolling forward 
by one month). For example, the 11.09% annualized return of the advanced markets (2006) is calculated as the average OOS annualized return of twelve portfolios. The first 
portfolio’s OOS return is calculated over January 2006 using as IS the period 01/01/2005-31/12/2005. The remaining eleven OOS returns are calculated by rolling forward the 
IS by one month. The same logic applies for the Sharpe ratios. The last column and row present the average performance per market across all years and per year respectively.   
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Table B.9 
Annualized Returns and Sharpe Ratios after Transaction Costs (IS 1 Year and OOS 3 Months) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced -2.28%  (-0.30) 
-13.59%  
(-1.43) 
11.16% 
(0.57) 
-5.01%  
(-0.38) 
-8.71%  
(-1.93) 
-11.44%  
(-1.39) 
-1.66%  
(-0.62) 
3.71% 
(0.66) 
-1.28%  
(-0.36) 
-3.35%  
(-1.41) 
-3.25%  
(-0.66) 
US 3.83%  (0.48) 
-13.72%  
(-1.20) 
19.13% 
(0.75) 
-7.39%  
(-0.47) 
-7.10%  
(-1.11) 
-11.95%  
(-1.56) 
0.11% 
(0.04) 
8.93% 
(1.23) 
2.91% 
(0.44) 
-1.35%  
(-0.57) 
-0.66%  
(-0.20) 
UK 16.96% (1.51) 
-5.58%  
(-0.53) 
14.57% 
(0.52) 
9.43%  
(0.66) 
-8.81%  
(-1.28) 
-16.99%  
(-1.55) 
-2.29%  
(-1.84) 
1.33% 
(0.25) 
-4.49%  
(-1.10) 
-1.92%  
(-0.44) 
0.22%  
(-0.38) 
Japan -18.53%  (-1.12) 
-0.83%  
(-0.12) 
24.25% 
(0.84) 
-0.44%  
(-0.02) 
-5.29%  
(-1.05) 
-14.05%  
(-2.07) 
-2.44%  
(-1.20) 
-4.51%  
(-0.44) 
-3.76%  
(-2.28) 
-5.09%  
(-0.96) 
-3.07%  
(-0.84) 
Emerging -6.89%  (-0.60) 
-0.68%  
(-0.04) 
8.65%  
(0.30) 
3.29%  
(0.26) 
-5.16%  
(-0.91) 
-5.96%  
(-0.91) 
-5.4%  
(-1.24) 
-3.66%  
(-0.95) 
-6.26%  
(-2.31) 
-7.74%  
(-1.39) 
-2.98%  
(-0.78) 
Russia 11.32%  (0.50) 
-19.86%  
(-1.82) 
50.97% 
(0.92) 
0.85%  
(0.04) 
-8.58%  
(-0.92) 
-27.03%  
(-2.69) 
-1.60%  
(-0.24) 
-6.99%  
(-1.05) 
1.75%  
(0.10) 
-14.57%  
(-1.25) 
-1.37%  
(-0.64) 
China 31.65% (1.52) 
13.12% 
(0.55) 
-12.97%  
(-0.51) 
-8.78%  
(-0.52) 
-8.99%  
(-1.42) 
-8.86%  
(-1.30) 
-3.07%  
(-1.73) 
-7.99%  
(-1.26) 
-7.77%  
(-1.10) 
5.67%  
(0.40) 
-0.80%  
(-0.54) 
Brazil -14.85%  (-0.69) 
24.47% 
(0.75) 
52.01% 
(1.21) 
11.24% 
(0.55) 
-7.63%  
(-0.97) 
-9.45%  
(-1.21) 
-10.83%  
(-1.98) 
-0.58%  
(-0.09) 
-4.63%  
(-0.43) 
-1.16%  
(-0.06) 
3.86%  
(-0.29) 
Frontier -16.7%  (-2.16) 
7.56%  
(0.68) 
29.16% 
(1.59) 
-2.46%  
(-0.32) 
3.26%  
(0.80) 
-8.84%  
(-1.66) 
-4.11%  
(-1.10) 
-4.45%  
(-1.40) 
-5.22%  
(-1.28) 
6.75% 
(0.84) 
0.5%  
(-0.40) 
Estonia -16.4%  (-1.38) 
-10.4%  
(-0.77) 
65.84% 
(1.54) 
5.71%  
(0.25) 
-2.00%  
(-0.17) 
-12.07%  
(-0.82) 
4.74% 
(0.73) 
-3.48%  
(-0.46) 
2.14% 
(0.24) 
-9.68%  
(-2.18) 
2.44%  
(-0.30) 
Morocco 6.81%  (0.50) 
14.73% 
(1.12) 
11.77% 
(0.62) 
-7.6%  
(-0.85) 
-6.11%  
(-1.80) 
-6.56%  
(-1.81) 
-2.05%  
(-0.19) 
-4.1%  
(-2.16) 
-2.41%  
(-1.60) 
-2.01%  
(-0.33) 
0.25%  
(-0.65) 
Jordan 3.76%  (0.27) 
5.43%  
(0.59) 
22.25% 
(0.88) 
-11.33%  
(-1.13) 
-5.80%  
(-1.74) 
-1.03%  
(-0.15) 
-7.32%  
(-2.06) 
-6.12%  
(-1.45) 
-3.78%  
(-1.21) 
-2.23%  
(-1.20) 
-0.62%  
(-0.72) 
Average -0.11%  (-0.12) 
0.05%  
(-0.18) 
24.73% 
(0.77) 
-1.04%  
(-0.16) 
-5.91%  
(-1.04) 
-11.19%  
(-1.43) 
-2.99%  
(-0.95) 
-2.33%  
(-0.59) 
-2.73%  
(-0.91) 
-3.06%  
(-0.71) 
-0.46%  
(-0.53) 
This table reports the average OOS annualized returns and Sharpe ratios of four portfolios for IS of one year and OOS of three months after transaction costs (rolling forward 
by one month). For example, the -2.28% annualized return of the advanced markets (2006) is calculated as the average OOS annualized return of twelve portfolios. The first 
portfolio’s OOS return is calculated over the period 01/01/2006-31/03/2006 using as IS the period 01/01//2005-31/12/2005. The remaining eleven OOS returns are calculated 
by rolling forward the IS and the OOS by one month. The same logic applies for the Sharpe ratios. The last column and row present the average performance per market across 
all years and per year respectively. 
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Table B.10 
Annualized Returns and Sharpe Ratios after Transaction Costs (IS 1 Year and OOS 6 Months) 
Market 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Advanced -5.63%  (-0.78) 
-8.98%  
(-0.86) 
5.18% 
(0.31) 
-2.7%  
(-0.25) 
-5.56%  
(-1.30) 
-8.33%  
(-1.14) 
-0.57%  
(-0.23) 
3.08% 
(0.57) 
-1.39%  
(-0.41) 
-2.00%  
(-0.76) 
-2.69%  
(-0.49) 
US 2.85% (0.36) 
-13.17%  
(-1.06) 
11.5% 
(0.53) 
-3.28%  
(-0.25) 
-4.6%  
(-0.77) 
-7.73%  
(-1.10) 
1.19% 
(0.38) 
6.1%  
(0.89) 
2.69% 
(0.39) 
-2.28%  
(-0.88) 
-0.67%  
(-0.15) 
UK 17.37% (1.50) 
-11.36%  
(-1.00) 
9.35% 
(0.45) 
7.37%  
(0.53) 
-5.19%  
(-0.73) 
-11.88%  
(-1.14) 
-1.75%  
(-1.53) 
1.02% 
(0.21) 
-4.33%  
(-1.14) 
-3.64%  
(-0.81) 
-0.30%  
(-0.37) 
Japan -19.27%  (-1.15) 
-5.64%  
(-0.77) 
18.15% 
(0.57) 
-4.71%  
(-0.29) 
-4.35%  
(-0.91) 
-11.51%  
(-1.79) 
-1.66%  
(-0.53) 
-7.96%  
(-0.89) 
-2.73%  
(-1.72) 
-4.56%  
(-0.83) 
-4.42%  
(-0.83) 
Emerging -10.01%  (-0.94) 
0.18% 
(0.01) 
15.81% 
(0.55) 
5.71%  
(0.47) 
-2.45%  
(-0.45) 
-8.8%  
(-1.30) 
-2.79%  
(-0.59) 
-6.14%  
(-1.48) 
-5.29%  
(-2.08) 
-4.36%  
(-0.73) 
-1.81%  
(-0.65) 
Russia -1.91%  (-0.11) 
-22.93%  
(-2.14) 
82.47% 
(1.20) 
-5.17%  
(-0.25) 
-6.1%  
(-0.74) 
-17.8%  
(-1.59) 
-2.53%  
(-0.41) 
-10.39%  
(-1.56) 
0.65% 
(0.04) 
-8.66%  
(-0.71) 
0.76%  
(-0.63) 
China 26.65% (1.37) 
11.83% 
(0.52) 
-4.14%  
(-0.15) 
-5.06%  
(-0.32) 
-4.39% 
(-0.74) 
-8.11%  
(-1.30) 
-2.50%  
(-1.57) 
-10.32%  
(-1.58) 
0.65% 
(0.08) 
0.00%  
(0.00) 
0.46%  
(-0.37) 
Brazil -20.72%  (-0.96) 
31.88% 
(0.83) 
24.5% 
(0.80) 
8.45%  
(0.44) 
-3.76%  
(-0.48) 
-9.81%  
(-1.45) 
-7.86%  
(-1.47) 
-0.85%  
(-0.13) 
-11.6%  
(-1.07) 
-10.01%  
(-0.54) 
0.02%  
(-0.4) 
Frontier -13.27%  (-1.96) 
3.57% 
(0.34) 
22.57% 
(1.34) 
-3.1%  
(-0.48) 
2.78% 
(0.68) 
-7.36%  
(-1.51) 
-1.9%  
(-0.52) 
-2.31%  
(-0.68) 
-6.02%  
(-1.69) 
7.67% 
(0.95) 
0.26%  
(-0.35) 
Estonia -14.15%  (-1.14) 
-5.34%  
(-0.42) 
37.53% 
(1.05) 
8.79%  
(0.40) 
-0.14%  
(-0.01) 
-17.09%  
(-1.28) 
2.31% 
(0.38) 
-4.37%  
(-0.68) 
-4.17%  
(-0.56) 
-8.15%  
(-1.61) 
-0.48%  
(-0.39) 
Morocco 1.15% (0.09) 
14.15% 
(1.06) 
-0.90%  
(-0.06) 
-7.89%  
(-0.97) 
-5.22%  
(-1.49) 
-4.44%  
(-1.19) 
-2.55%  
(-0.26) 
-1.92%  
(-1.01) 
-2.92%  
(-1.74) 
-5.03%  
(-0.82) 
-1.56%  
(-0.64) 
Jordan 4.05% (0.31) 
3.48% 
(0.38) 
19.08% 
(0.84) 
-11.84%  
(-1.27) 
-4.89%  
(-1.33) 
-1.70%  
(-0.26) 
-7.22%  
(-2.06) 
-5.10%  
(-1.05) 
-3.28%  
(-1.27) 
-2.66%  
(-1.41) 
-1.01%  
(-0.71) 
Average -2.74%  (-0.28) 
-0.19%  
(-0.26) 
20.09% 
(0.62) 
-1.12%  
(-0.19) 
-3.65%  
(-0.69) 
-9.55%  
(-1.26) 
-2.32%  
(-0.70) 
-3.26%  
(-0.62) 
-3.14%  
(-0.93) 
-3.64%  
(-0.68) 
-0.95%  
(-0.50) 
This table reports the average OOS annualized returns and Sharpe ratios of four portfolios for IS of one year and OOS of six months after transaction costs (rolling forward by 
one month). For example, the -5.63% annualized return of the advanced markets (2006) is calculated as the average OOS annualized return of twelve portfolios. The first 
portfolio’s OOS return is calculated over the period 01/01/2006-31/06/2006 using as IS the period 01/01//2005-31/12/2005. The remaining eleven OOS returns are calculated 
by rolling forward the IS and the OOS by one month. The same logic applies for the Sharpe ratios. The last column and row present the average performance per market across 
all years and per year respectively. 
 
